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INTRODUCTION
The relevance of drug and alcohol involvement to
sentencing law and practice is one of the most perplexing and
unsettled areas of sentencing law and practice. 1 It is also one
of the most important issues in the criminal justice system.
Most crimes are committed by offenders who are substance
involved, and nearly half of all crimes that are committed are
done so by offenders who are intoxicated at the time of the
offense. Substance involved individuals are grossly overrepresented in the criminal courts. Addiction and intoxication
impair sound judgment, and hence, it intuitively appears that
intoxicated offenders are less culpable for their crimes.
Moreover, there is often a sense that addiction and intoxication
causes aberrant behavior and that curing the substance
involvement will lead to more prudent (law-abiding) conduct.
Yet the damage caused by crimes committed by
intoxicated and addicted offenders is not diminished because
their conduct was influenced by drugs or alcohol. An
individual is no less dead if he or she is killed by a drug
addicted offender as opposed to another offender. The
competing issues relating to the sentencing of addicted and
intoxicated offenders are complex. The law regarding the
relevance of substance abuse to sentencing is incoherent and
confused. Every conceivable approach is supposedly tenable.
Substance abuse can sometimes mitigate or aggravate penalty,
and at other times it remains neutral. At other times it is
neutral. There are also a number of “fine” and often seemingly
contradictory principles that have been developed in this area
of law.
This Article injects clarity into the manner in which the
sentencing system should deal with intoxication and addiction.
The most common reason that substance abuse has an impact
on the sentencing calculus is because it supposedly effects the
culpability of the offender. It can reduce culpability because,
so the theory goes, many substance involved offenders are not
fully aware of the consequences of their actions. It has also
1. The principles governing both forms of addiction are similar. See
Damiani v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 358; [2006] WASCA 47, ¶ 2
(Austl.); infra Part III.
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been asserted that some individuals are driven to drugs and
alcohol due to difficult life circumstances and this inclines
them to criminal behavior. On the other hand, substance
involvement has also been held to necessitate a higher penalty2
when the offender is aware that intoxication can lead to
irresponsible behavior.
An evaluation of the correctness of these approaches
ostensibly invites exploration into what has been proven to be
thus far intractable philosophical issues of free will: the bounds
of personal responsibility and determinism. The more sound
approach, however, is driven by the clarity stemming from the
overarching objectives of the criminal justice system. This
reference point commands that the principal determinant of
offense severity is dictated by the level of harm caused by the
crime. The mental process and the precise causal levers that
prompt an offender to commit crime are distant secondary
considerations. The distorting effect that drugs and alcohol
have on an individual’s thinking, moral compass, and impulse
control are all interesting and even compelling areas of
learning. But they are largely irrelevant from the perspective
of a properly designed sentencing system. In this domain,
consequences, not behavioral triggers, are paramount. This
clarity is a key premise in this Article.
Additionally, we examine and evaluate other reasons that
have been given for incorporating substance involvement into
the sentencing calculus. These include the view that it is
supposedly relevant to the prospects of rehabilitation. While
some programs seem to reduce the recidivism rate of substance
affected offenders, other evidence suggests that overall these
offenders have a significantly higher rate of reoffending than
other offenders. 3 From the perspective of the prospects of
rehabilitation versus the higher rate of repeat offending by
substance involved offenders, we effectively arrive at a “one all
draw.” 4
An overarching and institutionally focused response to the
problem posed by substance involved offenders suggests that
substance use should not mitigate penalty. 5 It should not

2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
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aggravate penalty. The outcome of this proposition is not
nuanced or complex. It has one major advantage, however: it
is doctrinally sound. There are two further considerable
advantages from this approach. First, it can be effectively,
readily, and transparently implemented. Second, it injects
jurisprudential and normative rigor into the sentencing
calculus. It corrects distortions to sentencing outcomes which
stem from misguided theoretical underpinnings and
unattainable sentencing objectives.
Nevertheless, it is important to give due weight to the
correlation between substance use and criminal conduct. The
link between substance involvement and crime should be
promulgated and publicized. There are many good reasons
people have for not consuming drugs and alcohol. The health
reasons are generally well-known due to community education
campaigns. However, the criminogenic reasons are less
evident. The fact that people who take substances statistically
have a much higher risk of committing crime 6 and being
sentenced to imprisonment should be promoted as an
additional reason to desist from substance intake. Further,
more public health funding should be devoted to alcohol and
drug programs in both the general community and criminal
justice settings (including imprisonment).
A limitation to the recommendations and discussion in
this Article is that we do not focus on the relevance of
substance involvement to capital cases. The extreme nature of
the death penalty often compels different jurisprudential
principles. 7 Excluding consideration of death penalty cases
does not constitute a serious limitation to this Article. The
United States is the only developed nation apart from Japan
that still imposes the death penalty. 8 Moreover, not all states
in America impose the death penalty 9 and only a relatively
6. See infra Part II.
7. The proportionality principle derived from the Eight Amendment is, for
example, applicable to the death penalty but rarely to other forms of punishment.
See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554
U.S. 407 (2008).
8. See Death Penalty Information Center: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries?scid=30&did=140.
9. There are thirty-two states which still have the death penalty. States
with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited
Aug. 21, 2015).
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small number of criminals are executed in the United States. 10
We start in Part I by examining the extent of the
connection between drugs, alcohol, and crime, and note that
reliable studies establish that most individuals that commit a
crime are substance involved and that nearly half of all
offenders are intoxicated at the time of offending. In Part II,
we analyze and critique the existing law on substance abuse
and sentencing. We first consider the legal position in two
jurisdictions: Australia and the United States. This approach
in Australia is illuminating because the courts have more
expansively discussed the doctrinal underpinnings for taking
substance involvement into account in the sentencing calculus
than in the United States. Australian sentencing law also has
the same overarching objectives as that in the United States
(namely incapacitation, general and specific deterrence, and
rehabilitation). 11 However, unlike the United States, there
remains a large degree of judicial discretion reposed in
sentencing decisions and this provides a useful reference point
to this discussion.
Moreover, the extensive judicial
examination of this issue in Australia could potentially
enlighten the future direction and development of sentencing
law in the United States, so far as it concerns substance
involved offenders. Reform proposals are set out in Part IV of
the Article.
I. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM: MOST CRIMES ARE
COMMITTED BY OFFENDERS WHO ARE SUBSTANCE
INVOLVED
In this Article we consider the connection between illicit
drugs, alcohol, and crime. This Article refers to both illicit
drugs and alcohol as “substances.” The illegal nature of certain
drugs sets them apart from alcohol in some respects, namely
they are often more expensive than alcohol and cannot be
purchased and consumed in controlled doses. Illicit drugs and
alcohol both have the commonality that they can impair
judgement and perception. Further, the coupling of alcohol and
illicit drugs into the single generic category is consistent with

10. Since 1976, there have been 1,413 executions. Executions by Year,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year
(last updated Aug. 13, 2015).
11. See infra Part II.
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the approach taken in most studies and the literature
examining the connection between substances and crime. 12
Accordingly, unless expressly indicated to the contrary in this
Article, the term “substance” or “drug” refers to both alcohol
and illicit drugs.
Ascertaining the extent to which substance use
contributes to crime is complex. As noted by the Australian
Institute of Criminology, in trying to ascertain the extent of
crime that is drug related: “all estimates, including those
presented in this study, rely on complex calculation techniques
and assumptions that may not hold true in the real world.” 13
A. American Studies
Despite these complexities, as noted below, numerous
wide-ranging studies have been undertaken in an attempt to
at least approximate the extent of the link between substance
abuse and crime. A 2010 report by The National Centre on
Addiction and Substance Abuse, (proclaiming to be the “most
exhaustive analysis ever undertaken to identify the extent to
which alcohol and other drugs are implicated in the crimes and
incarceration of America’s prison population.” 14) reports that
84.8% of all incarcerated offenders in United States at the time
of survey (2006) were “substance involved.” 15
Most of these offenders (65%) satisfied the DSM-IV
medical criteria for alcohol or drug abuse and addiction. 16 The
report is an update of the 1998 report by the same Centre 17
which showed that four out of five of America’s 1.7 million
inmates (at that time) were substance involved in 1996. 18 By
12. See infra Part III.
13. Jason Payne & Antonette Gaffney, How Much Crime is Drug or Alcohol
Related? Self-reported Attributions of Police Detainees, 439 AUSTL. INST. OF
CRIMINOLOGY 5 (2012).
14. Behind Bars II: Substance Abuse and America’s Prison Population,
CASACOLUMBIA (Feb. 2010), http://www.casacolumbia.org/addiction-research/
reports/substance-abuse-prison-system-2010. The report notes: “To conduct this
study, CASA analyzed data on inmates from 11 federal sources, reviewed more
than 650 articles and other publications, examined best practices in prevention
and treatment for substance-involved offenders, reviewed accreditation
standards and analyzed costs and benefits of treatment.” Id. at 1.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1
17. Id.
18. CASA, Behind Bars: Substance Abuse and America’s Prison Population
(1998).
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the time the latter report was completed, the prison population
had risen to 2.3 million and the rate of substance involved
inmates had increased by approximately 5%. 19 Not only is
substance involvement endemic among offenders, in relative
terms offenders are far more likely to use drugs than other
individuals. The 2010 Report notes that inmates are seven
times more likely to have a substance abuse disorder than
individuals in the general population.” 20 A slightly greater
portion of property offenders than violent offenders were
substance involved (83.4% compared to 77.5%). 21
It is worth noting that the above report gives “substance
involved” a wide definition and, in particular, it does not
require a causal nexus between the substance use and the
crime. “Substance involved” refers to inmates who:
•

had a history of using illicit drugs regularly (i.e.,
one or more times a week for at least a month);

•

met medical criteria for a substance use disorder;

•

were under the influence of alcohol or other drugs
when they committed their crimes;

•

had a history of alcohol treatment;

•

were incarcerated for a drug law violation;

•

were incarcerated for an alcohol law violation; or

•

had some combination of these characteristics. 22

The breadth with which substance involvement is defined
does not establish a causal connection between drug or alcohol
use and the present offense. For example, the fact that an
offender has previously sought alcohol treatment or at some
point in his or her life used drugs during the month preceding
the offense does not mean that drugs were a contributing factor
to the present offense.
Despite the wide definition of substance use by the above
study, the findings are in keeping with other wide-ranging

19. See Behind Bars II, supra note 14.
20. Id. at 3. In 2013, it was estimated that in the United States Overall, 17.3
million people had an alcohol dependency and a further 6.9 million had an illicit
drug dependency. Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and
Health: Summary of National Findings, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
81 (2014), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH
resultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHresults2013.pdf.
21. Behind Bars II, supra note 14, at 2.
22. Behind Bars II, supra note 14, at 3.
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studies relating to the link between drugs and crime. In terms
of historic drug use (i.e., drug use that significantly predated
the present offense), and drug use in the month prior to the
offending, a report by the United States Bureau of Justice
Studies also notes a strong association between substance use
and crime. The Bureau of Justice Studies report notes:
In 1991, 60% of federal prisoners reported prior drug use,
compared to 79% of state prisoners. In 1997 this gap in
prior drug use was narrowed, as the percentage of federal
inmates reporting past drug use rose to 73%, compared to
83% of state inmates. By 2004 this gap was almost closed,
as state prisoner reports of lifetime drug use stayed at 83%,
while federal inmates rose to 79%. . . . Although the
proportion of federal prisoners held for drug offenses
dropped from 63% in 1997 to 55% in 2004, the percentage
of all federal inmates who reported using drugs in the
month before the offense rose from 45% to 50%. 23

A more illuminating and telling statistic regarding the
connection between substance use and crime is the percentage
of offenders who were under the influence of drugs or alcohol
at the time of the crime (as opposed to those that used drugs in
some defined period prior to the offending). According to the
2010 study conducted by the National Centre on Addiction and
Substance Abuse, the figure was 42.8%. 24 This is slightly
higher than the survey data from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, which still reports that a high number of offenders
are intoxicated at the time of offending. This data states: “In
the 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional
Facilities, 32% of state prisoners and 26% of federal prisoners
said they had committed their current offense while under the
influence of drugs.” 25
The Bureau of Justice Statistics also surveyed victims of
violent offenses regarding their perception of the state of
offenders. According to the National Crime Victimization
Survey (NCVS), the portion of victims who stated that they
believed the offender was substance affected at the time of the
offense is similar to the frequency reported by offenders:
23. Jennifer C. Karberg & Christopher J. Mumola, Drug Use and
Dependence, State and Federal Prisoners, 2004, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
(Oct. 11, 2006), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=778.
24. Behind Bars II, supra note 14, at 11.
25. Karberg supra note 23.
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In 2007, there were 5.2 million violent victimizations of
residents age 12 or older. Victims of violence were asked to
describe whether they perceived the offender to have been
drinking or using drugs. 26 About 26% of the victims of
violence reported that the offender was using drugs or
alcohol. 27

Another close correlation between crime and drugs or
alcohol arises when the offense is committed in order to
purchase drugs. The 2010 Report by the National Centre on
Addiction and Substance Abuse states that 15% of offenders
committed crime to obtain money to buy drugs. 28 This figure
is nearly identical to data reported by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics which states that 17% of state inmates and 18% of
federal inmates committed their offenses to obtain money to
purchase drugs. 29
B. Australian Studies
The empirical evidence from Australia regarding the link
between drugs and crime is similar to that in the United
States. The most recent wide-ranging Australian study was
undertaken by the Australian Institute of Criminology. The
study focused on self-reported causes of crime. 30 The study
consisted of 1,884 detainees who were interviewed in 2009. 31
Thus, the study was undertaken at the time of arrest. The
results of the Australian Institute of Criminology Australian
study were in keeping with a study published in 2008, which
asked detainees to report on not only the specific offenses for
which they were detained, but also on all the offenses within
the proceeding twelve months. 32
Most of the detainees (1,631, or 88%) reported using drugs
in the 30 days prior to arrest (the number using illegal drugs
was 1,113, and alcohol 1,376). 33 Similar to the situation in the
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Behind Bars II’, supra note 14, at 11.
29. Karberg supra note 23.
30. See Payne, supra note 13.
31. Id. at 1.
32. T. Makkai & J. Temple, Drugs and Crime: Calculating Attributable
Fractions, in COUNTING THE COST: ESTIMATES OF THE SOCIAL COSTS OF DRUG
ABUSE IN AUSTRALIA IN 2005–2006 (D. Collins & H Lapsley eds., 2008).
33. Payne, supra note 13. Many detainees used both drugs and alcohol, and
thus, the combined figure (2,489) is more than the total number of detainees
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United States, the rate of substance abuse among offenders in
Australia is far higher than the general community. 34
According to the Australian Institute of Criminology
report, approximately half of all detainees (45%) attributed
their offending to either drug or alcohol use, or both. 35 The
drug-crime attribution for alcohol was 30%, while for illegal
drugs it was 19% 36 (with heroin having the highest attribution
level—54% of users 37—and LSD had the lowest attribution
level—9% 38). For offenders who attributed their offending to
illicit drug use, 25% stated they committed the crime to get
money to purchase drugs; 40% stated that they were
intoxicated at the time of the offense; 20% stated they were
“hanging out for drugs”; and 38% gave other reasons. 39 The
same questions were not asked of those who attributed their
offending to alcohol—it was assumed that the majority of crime
which was attributed to alcohol was on the basis that the
offender was intoxicated. 40
In total, the detainees were charged with 4,237 offenses,
including: 753 violent offenses, 867 property offenses, and 896
relating to a breach of justice order. 41 In all, 48% of the offenses
were said to be attributable to either drug or alcohol use.42
Most detainees (52%) who were charged with property offenses
attributed their crimes to drugs (37%) or alcohol (21%) 43; while
a slightly lower portion (42%) of violent offenders attributed

(1,631).
34. 2007 National Drug Strategy Household Survey: Detailed Findings,
AUSTRALIAN INST. OF
HEALTH & WELFARE (Dec.
18,
2008),
http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6442459906.
35. Payne, supra note 13.
36. Payne, supra note 13.
37. Payne, supra note 13, at 3. Only 11.4% of the sample used heroin in the
past 30 days.
38. Payne, supra note 13, at 3. Only 2.3% of the sample used LSD in the
previous 30 days.
39. Payne, supra note 13, at 4. The figures do not equate to 100 because
some interviewees gave more than one answer.
40. Payne, supra note 13, at 4.
41. Payne, supra note 13, at 4.
42. Payne, supra note 13. This figure is different to the number of detainees
that were substance involved (45%) because some detainees were charged with
more than one offense.
43. Payne, supra note 13. The combined total of drugs and alcohol does not
equate to the whole because some offenders attributed their offending to both
substances.
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their crimes to drugs (12%) or alcohol (34%). 44
The profiles of the individuals who are the subjects of the
key reports above vary slightly. The United States data relates
to inmates (i.e., convicted offenders), whereas the Australian
data refers to individuals who have been charged with offenses.
However, in real terms the cohorts are similar, given that in
Australia more than 90% of charged offenders are found
guilty. 45 Accordingly, in light of the large number of individuals
involved in the respective studies and the fact that the studies
relate to two different countries, three reasonably conclusive
observations can be made regarding the link between
substances and crime:
•

The majority of criminal offenders are substance
involved;

•

A large portion of offenders (over 30%) commit their
offense while under the influence of alcohol or illicit
drugs at time of the offense; and

•

Nearly 20% of offenders commit crime to purchase
drugs.

II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
We now analyze the manner in which sentencing law
currently deals with the substance involved offenders. In
doing so, we first discuss the situation in Australia, given that
it is in this jurisdiction that the issue has been subject to the
greatest amount of judicial discussion and evaluation.
A. Substantive Involvement and Australian Sentencing
Law
1. Overview of Australian Sentencing Law and
Practice
Prior to examining the relevance of intoxication to
sentencing, we first provide an overview of the sentencing

44. Payne, supra note 13, at 45. The combined total of drugs and alcohol
does not equate to the whole because some offenders attributed their offending to
both substances.
45. MIRKO BAGARIC & RICHARD EDNEY, AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2014).
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regime in Australia. Sentencing law differs in each Australian
jurisdiction (the six states, Northern Territory, the Australian
Capital Territory, and the Federal jurisdiction). 46 However,
there is considerable convergence in relation to a number of
key areas. 47 All Australian jurisdictions pursue the same
fundamental objectives of sentencing, in the form of
incapacitation (also referred to as community protection),
general deterrence, specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and
retribution. 48
By contrast to the sentencing system in the United
States, 49 a distinctive aspect of the Australian sentencing
system is that courts normally have a wider discretion
regarding choice of penalty. 50 Fixed penalties for serious
offenses in Australia are rare. 51 The reasoning process that
judges undertake in making sentencing decisions is known as
the “instinctive synthesis.” 52 This is a mechanism whereby
sentencers make a decision regarding all of the considerations
that are relevant to sentencing and then give due weight to
each of them (and, in the process, incorporate considerations
that incline to a heavier penalty and offset against them
factors that favor a lesser penalty) and then set a precise
penalty. 53 “The hallmark of this process is that it does not
require (nor permit) judges to set out with any particularity
the weight (in mathematical terms) accorded to any particular
consideration.” 54 Patent subjectivity is incorporated into the
sentencing calculus. Current orthodoxy maintains that there
is no single correct sentence 55 and that the “instinctive
synthesis will, by definition, produce outcomes upon which
reasonable minds will differ.” 56 Under this model, courts can
impose a sentence within an “available range” of penalties.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See infra Part II.B.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The term originates from the decision in R v Williscroft (1975) VR 292
(Austl.).
53. R v Williscroft (1975) VR 292.
54. Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness To Arbitrariness—The Need
to Abolish the Stain that is the Instinctive Synthesis in Australian Sentencing 38
UNIV. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 76. (2015) .
55. Markarian v The Queen (2005) HCA 25, ¶27, ¶133.
56. Hudson v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 199, 206.
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The spectrum of this range is not clearly defined.
Some degree of predictability 57 is injected into the
sentencing system by the fact that the proportionality principle
is adopted in all jurisdictions. 58 This is the main determinant
of sentence type and severity. A clear statement of the
principle is provided by the High Court of Australia in Hoare v
The Queen, where the Court stated: “[A] basic principle of
sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed by
a court should never exceed that which can be justified as
appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime
considered in the light of its objective circumstances.” 59
Another defining aspect of Australian sentencing law is
the large number of considerations (more than 200) that can
either mitigate or aggravate penalty. 60 There are four
categories of mitigating factors. 61 The first are those relating
to the offender’s response to a charge and include pleading
guilty 62 and remorse. 63 The second category consists of factors
that relate to the circumstances of the offense and which
contribute to, and to some extent explain, the offending. These
include mental impairment 64 and provocation. 65 The third
category relates to matters that are personal to the offender,
such as youth, 66 and good prospects of rehabilitation. 67 The
impact of the sanction is the fourth broad type of mitigating
factor, and includes considerations such as onerous prison

57. However, as noted below the level of predictability is relatively minor.
See Bagaric, supra note 54, at 77.
58. BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45.
59. Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354.
60. Compare JOANNA SHAPLAND, BETWEEN CONVICTION AND SENTENCE:
THE PROCESS OF MITIGATION 43 (1981) (identifying 229 factors), with LA TROBE
UNIV., GUILTY, YOUR WORSHIP: A STUDY OF VICTORIA’S MAGISTRATES’ COURTS
(1980) (identifying 292 relevant sentencing factors’).
61. See VICTORIAN SENTENCING COMMITTEE REPORT, SENTENCING 359–60
(1988).
62. See Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 (Austl.).
63. R v Whyte (2004) 7 VR 397; Barbaro v The Queen (2012) VSCA 288;
Phillips v The Queen (2012) VSCA 140.
64. See R v Tsiaras (1996) 1 VR 398; see also Muldrock v The Queen (2011)
244 CLR 120; R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269.
65. Va v The Queen (2011) VSCA 426.
66. R v Neilson (2011) QCA 369; R v Kuzmanovski; Ex parte Attorney-General
(Qld) (2012) QCA 19.
67. R v Osenkowski (1982) 30 SASR 212; R v. Skilbeck (2010) SASCFC 35;
Elyard v The Queen (2006) NSWCCA 43.
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conditions, 68 and public opprobrium. 69 Additionally, there are
also a large number of aggravating factors, including: prior
criminal record, 70 high level of planning, 71 offending committed
while on bail, 72 and breach of trust. 73
The obscure nature of the proportionality principle, 74 the
large number of aggravating and mitigating considerations,
and the fact that judges do not indicate the weight or emphasis
accorded to each consideration are the key reasons that
sentencing in Australia remains unpredictable and
inconsistent. 75 The largely unfettered discretionary nature of
Australian sentencing calculus is similar to the uncontrolled
sentencing process used in parts of the United States fifty
years ago, which led Justice Marvel Frankel to describe the
system as lawless. 76 In a similar vein, in Mistretta v. United
States it was noted that indeterminate sentencing had been
criticised for producing “ ‘ shameful’ consequences . . . [in the
form of a] . . . great variation among sentences imposed by
different judges upon similarly situated offenders . . . [and] . . .
uncertainty as to the time the offender would spend in
prison.”77 The fact that sentencing principles in Australia are
not densely prescribed by statute provides the opportunity and
catalyst for extensive judicial development and analysis of
sentencing concepts. This includes the role that alcohol and
illicit drug 78 involvement should have in sentencing.
68. Western Australia v O’Kane (2011) WASCA 24; R v Puc (2008) VSCA 159;
Tognolini v The Queen (2012) VSCA 311.
69. Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267.
70. Field v The Queen (2011) NSWCCA 13; Saunders v The Queen (2010)
VSCA 93.
71. R v Yildiz (2006) 160 A Crim R 218; R v Douglas (2004) 146 A Crim R
590.
72. R v Gray (1977) VR 225; R v Basso (1999) 108 A Crim R 392; R v AD
(2008) NSWCCA 289.
73. Director of Public Prosecutions v Truong (2004) VSCA 172; Carreras v
The Queen (1992) 60 A Crim R 402; Attorney-General v Saunders (2000) TASSC
22; Hill v The Queen (1999) TASSC 29; R v Ottobrino (1999) WASCA 207; R v
Black (2002) WASCA 26.
74. See Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is
Proportionality in Sentencing (2013) 25 NEW ZEALAND UNIV. L. REV. 411 (2013).
75. BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45.
76. Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (1972). For
a critique of Frankel’s impact, see Lynn Adelman & Jon Dietrich, Marvin
Frankel’s Mistakes and the Need to Rethink Federal Sentencing, 13 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 239 (2008).
77. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).
78. The principles governing both forms of substances are similar. See
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This issue is marked by a high degree of uncertainty in
terms of identification of the relevant theoretical principles
and even more so when it comes to operationalizing any
principles. In more understated terms, the Court of Criminal
Appeal of New South Wales recently in Kukovec v R stated:
“the relevance of drug addiction in a sentencing exercise is a
matter of some complexity.” 79 There are authorities which
support every possible outcome regarding the impact that
substance involvement should have on sentencing. Sometimes
it has been held to be neutral (i.e., of no relevance), and at other
times it has been considered either an aggravating or
mitigating consideration. Thus, we see that in R v Koumis &
Ors it was stated that addiction is not of inherent relevance to
sentencing:
Drug addiction is not of itself a factor that necessarily calls
for a lesser sentence than would otherwise be appropriate.
The sentence to be fixed has to reflect the seriousness of the
crime of trafficking in substantial quantities of a drug of
dependence. Denunciation and general deterrence assume
particular importance as the purposes to be effectuated by
the sentence. Generally speaking, addiction and any
consequential impairment of judgment, will not have any
significant mitigatory effect upon those sentencing
considerations. 80

By contrast, in Vozlic v The Queen, the same Court noted
that “[a] fact such as drug addiction is a circumstance of the
offender which will often have an intrinsic relevance in the
sentencing process.” 81
2. The Relevance of Substance Involvement to
Sentencing in Australia
We now consider in greater detail all of the ways in which
substance involvement can impact sentencing. We start with
an examination of the case law suggesting it should have no
impact, and then consider the circumstances in which it has
been held to aggravate penalty. We then consider cases that

Damiani v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 358 ; [2006] WASCA 47, [2].
79. [2014] NSWCCA 308, [30]; see also Trajkovski v The Queen (2011) VSCA
170.
80. R v Koumis & Ors (2008) VSCA 84, [53]; see also R v SK (2009) NSWCCA
21.
81. Vozlic v The Queen (2013) VSCA 113, [26].
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suggest that substance involvement can be a mitigating factor.
It is desirable to commence this part of the discussion by
considering the authorities which suggest that substance
involvement should not impact penalty. It is in this context
that the relevance of substance abuse to sentencing has been
considered most thoroughly. A major theme is the extent to
which substance abuse can impact on the culpability of an
offender. Key to this analysis is supposedly the degree of
choice the offender had in taking drugs or alcohol. To this end,
there are four broad situations in which substance abuse can
be potentially relevant to sentencing:
(i) The choice to initially commence using drugs;
(ii) Succumbing to a craving to continue to use drugs;
(iii) Committing a crime to feed a drug craving (for
example, selling drugs to pay for a drug habit); and
(iv) Committing a crime while under the influence of
drugs, which impairs the judgement of the offender
(for example, assaulting a victim as a result of a
minor provocation).

The above four considerations were considered in the
landmark decision of R v Henry, 82 where the New South Wales
Court of Criminal Appeal issued a guideline judgment in
respect of the offense of armed robbery. 83 One of the issues
raised was the relevance of drug addiction to sentencing armed
robbers. In this case, the offender was addicted to drugs and
committed the crime to raise money to feed his drug habit. 84
The majority of the Court held that the offender’s drug habit
did not justify a reduced (or increased) sentence. In particular,
Spigelman CJ held that committing an armed robbery to
obtain funds to fund a drug addiction is not mitigatory. 85
82. (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; 106 A Crim R 149.
83. A guideline judgment is a sentencing decision which purposively sets out
for other courts the main considerations which are relevant in ascertaining an
appropriate penalty for a particular crime or the circumstances in which it is
appropriate to impose a certain type of sanction.
84. R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, 347.
85. See also, Johan v R (2015) NSWCCA 58. As discussed below, this is in
contrast to where an offender sells drugs to feed a drug habit, in which case drug
use is often regarded as a mitigating consideration. The contrast is made out in
R v Bouchard (1996) 84 A Crime R 499, at 501 in the following terms: ‘it may be
conceded that it [addiction] is a relevant and sometimes very significant factor in
sentencing that an offender engaged in trafficking, especially at ‘street level’, in
order to gain the wherewithal to satisfy his own craving, rather than as a non-
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In reaching this conclusion, Spigelman CJ had regard to
the neurobiological evidence regarding the causes and realities
of substance use. 86 Spigelman CJ concluded that at the key
different stages of the substance abuse cycle, individuals have
genuine choices regarding their actions. 87 These choices may
not always be completely free; however, he noted that this is a
reality that relates to many personal choices. 88 People, on his
assessment, need to take full moral and legal ownership for all
of their actions which they perform pursuant to a substantial
degree of choice. This, he suggested, was the situation in
relation to all aspects of the drug-offending cycle. Spigelman
CJ stated:
The authorities are against the proposition that drug
addiction should, of itself, be accepted as a mitigating
factor. There is authority that where the original addiction
was not a willed act, that may be taken into account by way
of mitigation. The authority does not go beyond. . . . It was
submitted that the degree of moral culpability of a
particular offender is diminished by addiction. Evidence
was put before the Court that there is, at least in some
cases, a genetic predisposition to addiction and that
addiction generally is not simply a state of mind but has a
neurobiological or physiological base. It was put that an
addict’s decision to perform a criminal act was not “a
completely free choice”. In my opinion drug addicts who
commit crime should not be added to the list of victims.
Their degree of moral culpability will vary, just as it varies
for individuals who are not affected by addiction. There are
a number of aspects of the relationship between drug
addiction and crime which indicate that moral choices are
made. First is the original decision to experiment with
drugs which, in the usual case, is a completely free choice.
The addictive quality of drugs, together with the anti-social
behaviour which so commonly results from addiction, is so
widely known that persons who choose a course of addiction
must be treated as choosing its consequences. Secondly, the
submissions in this Court were in error in identifying the
relevant conduct as the craving associated with
user acting purely for reasons of greed and in callous disregard of the grave harm
that offense does to its victims. But it is quite unsafe, in my opinion, to reason
from cases concerning narcotics to a case of armed robbery.”
86. Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, [200].
87. Id. at 197-210.
88. Id. at 197.
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withdrawal. The material presented to the Court did not
suggest that the choice faced by addicts was between this
negative feeling and the need for money to allay it. Rather
the choice may often be the desire for the positive feeling
said to be associated with a drug induced euphoria. The
desire to bring about that state of “well-being” is,
relevantly, a moral choice. Thirdly, nothing in either the
process of addiction or its neuro-biological and physiological
basis, leads ineluctably to the commission of crime, let
alone the commission of crimes of violence against persons,
such as armed robbery. Not all persons who suffer from
addiction behave in this way. Those that do so, make a
choice. . . . There is no warrant, in my opinion, to assess a
crime induced by a need for funds to feed a drug addiction,
as being lower in the scale of moral culpability than other
perceived requirements for money. 89

Simpson J in R v Henry took a different (minority
dissenting) view regarding the reality of choice experienced by
many offenders who have substance abuse problems. 90 In
relation to the decision to start using drugs (or alcohol), she
takes the view that this is often a symptom of an underlying
problem, and hence, the choice is far from free. Simpson J
states:
In the worst, or least forgivable, cases it may have its
origins in arrogance, in an antipathetical attitude to the
laws of society, or in weakness of character. In other cases,
I have no doubt, it has its origins in social disadvantage,
poverty, emotional, financial, or social deprivation, poor
educational achievement, unemployment, and the despair
and loss of self-worth that can result from these
circumstances or any combination of them. In this court
one sometimes sees cases in which drug taking stems from
sexual assault or exploitation, sometimes committed when
the person who turns to drugs, and who comes before the
court, is very young, and sometimes the precipitating
events have occurred many years before. Drug addiction is
not always the disease; it is, as often as not, a symptom of

89. Id. at 194-202. The position of Spigelman CJ is echoed by Wood CJ,
“[t]here remains for every offender a choice between reform and recidivism, and
the problem is better addressed by the development of adequate programs and
rehabilitation options within the prison environment, than it is by a significant
change in sentencing policy.” Henry, at [267].
90. Id. at 332–56.
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social disease. 91

She adds: “Drug addicts do not come to their addiction
from a social or environmental vacuum. This court should not
close its eyes to the multifarious circumstances of
disadvantage and deprivation that frequently precede and
precipitate a descent into illegal drug use.” 92
Further, she states that the concept of choice is even less
apt regarding the decision to continue to use drugs:
Nor can I accept that the exercise of free choice in the use
of drugs is always of equal dimensions. It is not every
decision to use drugs that can properly or fairly be
characterized as a decision made in the exercise of free
choice. The will of an individual can be overborne, or
undermined, not only by acts of another person, but also the
pressure of circumstances. I do not accept that most drug
offenders are truly exercising free will when they choose the
degradation,
despair,
criminality
and
cycle
of
imprisonment that can follow the initial use of illegal drugs.
The circumstances that propel the offender to use of drugs
are often, if not usually, beyond his or her control. They
may or may not be combined with a vulnerable personality
or even a weakness of character. Many drug offenders have
not had the life experiences or the normal developmental
path that permit a conclusion that the decision to take
drugs was a decision made in the exercise of a free choice in
the sense in which that phrase is ordinarily understood. 93

Thus, neither the majority nor minority in Henry take
issue with the link between crime, drugs, and alcohol. The key
difference relates to the notion of choice, and the extent to
which the choice to use drugs, and continue with their use is
“free.”
In order to fully understand this contrast, it is important
to note that there is a distinction in the criminal law between
responsibility and culpability. The concept of responsibility is
binary. Individuals are criminally responsible for a crime if
they have committed the actus reus of the offense, have the
relevant mens rea, and there is no applicable defense. 94 To
91. Id. at 336.
92. Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, 337.
93. Id. at 338.
94. KEN J. ARENSON ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL LAW IN THE COMMON
LAW JURISDICTIONS (4th ed., 2015); MARKUS DUBBER & MARK KELMAN,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed., 2009).
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satisfy the mens rea requirement, it is necessary for offenders
to intend to commit the crime or act recklessly in relation to its
occurrence. Some defenses are grounded in the absence of free
will, with duress being the clearest example. 95 If mens rea and
actus reus are established, and an offender cannot establish a
defense, he or she will be responsible for the crime.
Unlike responsibility, culpability comes in degrees. It
relates to the level of moral and legal blameworthiness of an
offender. This is a concept that is often invoked in sentencing
law. 96 Considerations that often are thought to diminish
culpability include: youth of the offender, and lack of
planning. 97 Moreover, a diminished level of freedom or choice
is normally associated with reduced culpability, thus mental
illness and diminished cognitive culpability are often
associated with reduced culpability. 98
The debate between Simpson J and Spigelman CJ does not
(if the words of Simpson J are taken literally) relate to a matter
of degree of choice or culpability. Simpson J goes so far as
stating that some substance abused offenders have their will
overborne, in a similar way to that which occurs as a result of
pressure by another person 99. Simpson J is, in effect, of the
view that the path chosen by some substance abused offenders
is so lacking in autonomous choice that they are not
responsible for their actions, in the same way that individuals
who commit crimes under coercion are not guilty. Spigelman
CJ, on the other hand, believes that diminution of choice is so
minor that it does not relevantly diminish the level of blame,
even for sentencing purposes. Thus, we see that their Honours

95. For a discussion of the elements of duress, see Monu Bedi, Excusing
Behavior: Reclassifying the Federal Common Law Defenses of Duress and
Necessity Relying on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 575 (2011).
96. BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45.
97. BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45.
98. For a discussion of this, see STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, WHEN DID PRISONS
BECOME ACCEPTABLE MENTAL HEALTHCARE FACILITIES?, 2 (2014); Note, The
Psychology of Cruelty: Recognizing Grave Mental Harm in American Prisons, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1250 (2015); Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1114 (2008); E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert:
A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147
(2013); Ian Freckelton, Sentencing Offenders with Impaired Mental Functioning
R v Verdins, Buckley and Vo, 14 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL., & L. 359 (2007); James
Ogloff et al., Psychiatric Symptoms and Histories among People Detained in Police
Cells, 46 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 871 (2011).
99. R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, 338.
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take a vastly different approach to the considerations that
effect drug and alcohol use, and ultimately the ramifications
this has for sentencing. In Part III of this Article, we analyze
and critique these approaches.
Before doing so, it should be noted that more recently, it
has been confirmed that armed robberies committed to feed a
drug problem do not merit less punishment than armed
robberies committed for other reasons. In R v Omar, the Court
stated:
[I]t would involve an exercise in irresponsibility on the part
of the Court, if it were understood as a message that
committing the crime of armed robbery to feed a drug habit
is less deserving of censure than would otherwise be the
case. The legislature has, by the heavy maximum penalty
prescribed for armed robbery, spoken clearly in relation to
this offense. Drug dependent persons should not be
encouraged, as a class, to think that they are free to engage
in serious criminal conduct of whatever kind with
impunity, or with any hope of favourable treatment because
they are able to show that they needed money through their
addiction. In summary, I see no reason to depart from the
planks of punishment, retribution and rehabilitation that
underlie the sentencing process generally, and that permit
of individualised sentencing by reference to the objective
and subjective circumstances of each case. 100

This is in contrast to a drug trafficking offense. It has been
held that drug addicts who sell drugs solely to feed their habit
should receive a lower penalty than offenders who sell drugs
solely for greed. 101 Further, it has been noted that it is unclear
whether this is because of an absence of an aggravating factor,
or because trafficking for addictive reasons is itself
mitigatory. 102
Substance involvement is, on occasion, treated as an
aggravating consideration. 103 This is most commonly the case
when the offender has knowledge that intoxication may lead to
criminal behavior. The level of the awareness that an offender
is required to have that intoxication could result in criminal
100. [2015] NSWCCA 67, [274]-[276].
101. R v Koumis & Ors (2008) VSCA 84.
102. Id. at 51; see also Vozlic v The Queen [2013] VSCA 113; R v Nagy [1992]
1 VR 637.
103. See e.g., R v Fletcher-Jones (1994) 75 A Crim R 381, 386–88; R v Groom
(1999) 2 VR 159, 164; R v Gordon (1994) 71 A Crim R 459.
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behavior is unclear. It is not a matter that has been
extensively discussed by the authorities. However, to the
extent that the issue has been canvassed, it seems that the
standard is readily satisfied—previous offending or
inappropriate behavior while intoxicated on any substance
would seem to suffice.
In R v Martin, the court sentenced an offender for a
murder committed while he was under the influence of
amphetamines. 104 In rejecting the submission that the use of
drugs was mitigating, and finding the opposite—that it was an
aggravating factor—the Court set out the relevant principle in
the following manner:
Voluntary ingestion of drugs should be approached no
differently from intoxication, in our view. The critical
question will be what the probable consequences of the
ingestion of the particular drug by the particular offender
were, and whether the offender foresaw those
consequences. . . . For these reasons, we agree with the
sentencing judge that the applicant’s drug-induced
psychosis was an aggravating factor. The contention that
his self-induced psychotic state was a mitigating factor
cannot be sustained. His moral culpability is the greater
because of his foreknowledge of the likely consequences of
his continued drug-taking, and his decision to continue
doing so, even when he was experiencing paranoid
delusions. In this sense, there is an important element of
deliberateness or premeditation about the course of conduct
on which the applicant embarked, which ultimately caused
the death of an innocent man. 105

In Damiani v Western Australia, the court stated that
“self-induced addiction at an age of rational choice establishes
moral culpability for the predictable consequences of that
choice.” 106 In R v Robazzini, 107 the appellant pleaded guilty to
a number of violent offenses committed while he was under the
influence of drugs and alcohol. 108 The Court held intoxication

104. R v Martin (2007) VSCA 291.
105. Id. 30, 53. See also, R v McCullagh (2003) 141 A Crim R 150, 158; R v
Currie (1988) 33 A Crim R 7, 9; Baumer v The Queen (1987) 27 A Crim R 143; R
v Laffey [1998] 1 VR 155.
106. (2006) 165 A Crim R 358, 3
107. (2010) VSCA 8.
108. Id. at 1–2.
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was an aggravating factor. 109 In doing so, it rejected a
submission that the consumption of drugs and alcohol can only
be aggravating if the offender previously offended while under
the influence of the same substance. The Court stated:
If a person acts violently after taking a legal or illicit drug
for the first time, he may be unaware of the effect that the
drug may have on him, so that his drug use should not be
taken into account as an aggravating factor. In this case
however, the appellant had used a number of different
drugs for many years. He was well aware that they had a
disinhibiting effect on him. His moral culpability is not
reduced because the “cocktail” he took before he committed
these offenses was not precisely the same as the different
mixtures of drugs he may have taken on other occasions
when he acted violently. 110

Thus, the test that must be satisfied in order for substance
involvement to be an aggravating factor is broad. It seems to
be capable of being established even if there is a single instance
of prior criminal behavior while the offender was affected by
drugs or alcohol. The type of substance in question does not
need to be identical to that which previously underpinned or
coincided with the criminal behavior, and it seems that there
does not need to be a close similarity between the respective
crimes. 111 The test would seem to have an objective and
subjective component: the offender must have actually
committed a crime while previously being drug or alcohol
affected, and must also be aware of this event. 112
Substance abuse can also be aggravating in more narrow
circumstances. For example, it has been held that intoxication
is also aggravating where it makes the offense more
frightening for the victim. 113 Addiction can also increase
sentence because it increases the risk of recidivism. As noted
by Wood CJ at Common Law in R v Henry, substance abuse
can: “impact upon the prospects of recidivism/rehabilitation, in
109. Id. at 60.
110. Id.
111. See Edwards v the Queen (2011) VSCA 87 at 5; R v Dosen (2012) VSCA
307 at 6.
112. The clearest instance of this is where the offender consumes drugs or
alcohol and knew of its effect on him or her. See R v Fletcher-Jones (1994) 75 A
Crim R 381; R v Hay (2007) VSCA 147 at 18.
113. R v Groom (1998) VSCA 146, 24, citing R v Sewell (1981) 29 S.A.S.R. 12
at 14–15.
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which respect it may on occasions prove to be a two-edged
sword.” 114
Another way in which substance involvement can relate to
sentencing is by reducing the penalty. It has been held that it
can have this effect for a variety of reasons. The first is where
it reduces the culpability of the offender because, for example,
it supposedly caused the offender to act out of character. 115 In
order it to have this effect, the onus is on the offender to
establish that he or she did not know that intoxication might
lead to criminal conduct. In Vergados v The Queen, the Court
stated:
If the respondent was aware that by taking the drug, his
judgment would be so affected that he would behave
irrationally or that it would affect his ability to exercise
control, his self-induced mental state would not constitute
a mitigating circumstance. It was for the respondent to
establish on the balance of probabilities that he did not
know that the drug would have such effects. 116

Substance abuse can also reduce the penalty where it
directly impacts on other recognized sentencing variables
which can mitigate sentence. It can do this in several ways.
First, it can be relevant to the degree of planning; which is in
fact ultimately relevant to culpability. In Arbili v. The Queen,
Schmidt J (with whom Hulme J agreed) stated:

114. R v Henry (1999) NSWCCA 111 [273]; see also R v McKee [2003] VSCA
16, at [13]; R v Hammond [1996] QCA 508; (1997) 2 Qd R 195, 199–200. The
possible relevance of addiction to rehabilitation is considered below. See Damiani
v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 358; [2006] WASCA 47 at 3, where it
was stated: “intoxication or addiction will be weighed against the other relevant
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, such as danger to the community and
prospects of rehabilitation (Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433; 20 ALR 1,
per Brennan J at [5] and Deane J at [21]; Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1987) 164
CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14 at 476).” The fact that an offender suffers from
alcoholism does not justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment for the sole
purpose that rehabilitation will be more likely to occur in a custodial setting.”
115. In Morrison v The Queen (2012) VSCA 222 at 17, it was held that alcohol
abuse may be mitigating where the offender has no previous indication that it
may cause him or her to engage in criminal conduct. Zelling, J in R v Sewell
(1981) 5 A Crim R 204, at 207, stated: “. . .[A] person under the influence of liquor
who is otherwise of blameless character may do something which is quite out of
character and the liquor may be both an explanation and a factor in mitigation,
but in other cases it may swing the penalty towards deterrence.” See XY v R
[2007] NSWCCA 72, [28]-[29].
116. (2011) VSCA 438, 47, citing Director of Public Prosecutions v Aryanitidis
(2008) VSCA 189, 29; see also Mune v The Queen (2011) VSCA 231, 32.
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This court has said on countless occasions that addiction to
heroin is not to be considered as a factor for the reduction
of what would otherwise be an appropriate sentence for the
nature of the offenses which have been committed. It
serves, however, to provide an explanation for the
commission of the offenses . . . . Drug addiction is one of the
circumstances of a particular offense that is relevant to the
sentencing exercise. It may, for example, be pertinent to
the issue of impulsiveness/planning or to the weight to be
given to rehabilitation in a particular case. 117

As noted in Morrison, addiction can also mitigate penalty
on the basis of rehabilitation. 118 However, in order to do so,
there must be “strong evidence of real progress towards actual
rehabilitation.” 119 In R v. Proom, Doyle CJ stated:
Addiction to drugs may indicate that assurances by an
offender of a desire to be rehabilitated are unreliable, or
must at least be treated with caution, and sadly may mean
that even a genuine wish to rehabilitate may have to be
treated with caution. In the worst case, if there is no reason
to think that the addiction will be broken, there will be no
basis for leniency by reference to the prospect of
rehabilitation. 120

Drug influenced offending can also be mitigating if the
offense is committed while an offender experiences a psychotic
reaction while trying to withdraw from drugs. 121
There are also a number of authorities suggesting that
substance involvement can be mitigatory where it was not
willed (i.e., there were other circumstances inclining an
individual to escape the realities of his or her life) and drugs or
alcohol played a role in the commission of a crime. In Brown v
The Queen, a thirty-one year old accused who had a long
criminal history pled guilty to breaking and entering, and drug
trafficking offenses. 122 He grew up in a violent household and

117. [2012] NSWCCA 48, 173-74 (quoting R v Valentini (1989) 46 A Crim R
23 at 25); see also Waters v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 219 at [37] , where lack of
planning was a mitigating factor for an intoxicated offender.
118. See Morrison v The Queen (2012) VSCA 222, 20.
119. Brown v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 335, 29, citing Simpson J in R v
Henry (1999) NSWCCA 111 at 244.
120. [2003] SASC 88, [50].
121. R v Sebalj (2006) VSCA 106 at [15]; see also R v Robazzini (2010) VSCA
8 at [61].
122. [2014] NSWCCA 335 at [2].
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commenced using drugs at the age of about nine or ten. 123 He
was using drugs at the time of these offenses, although at the
time of sentencing he was drug free. 124 In mitigating the
sentence, the Court endorsed the observation of Wood CJ at CL
in R v. Henry, which stipulated the drug offending can be
relevant to offender’s culpability by:
suggest[ing] that the addiction was not a matter of personal
choice but was attributable to some other event for which
the offender was not primarily responsible, for example
where it arose as the result of the medical prescription of
potentially addictive drugs following injury, illness, or
surgery (cf Hodge Court of Criminal Appeal New South
Wales 2 November 1993; and Talbot); or where it occurred
at a very young age, or in a person whose mental or
intellectual capacity was impaired, so that their ability to
exercise
appropriate
judgment
or
choice
was
incomplete. . . 125

However, this principle is not consistently applied. In
Avdic v The Queen, the Court sentenced a twenty-six year old
pregnant woman for armed robberies she committed while
under the influence of drugs. 126 She resorted to using drugs to
deal with the mental suffering stemming from sexual abuse
she experienced when she only fifteen years of age. 127 The
court accepted that it was a result of this traumatic event that
the offender starting using drugs, and that this resulted in her
moral compass being distorted. 128 The offender was drug free
at the time of sentencing and the Court accepted that she had
reasonable prospects of rehabilitation. No mitigation was
accorded for the fact that the drug abuse stemmed from what
was described as a “gross physical assault.” 129
This is in contrast to the more recent decision of El-Ahmad
v. The Queen, where the court provided a sentencing discount
to a substance addicted offender convicted of drug trafficking.
The offender had been addicted to drugs at an early age as a
result of the trauma of being forced into an arranged (abusive)

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 12–13.
[1999] NSWCCA 111 at [273].
[2012] VSCA 172 at [2].
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
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marriage. 130 The applicant sold drugs in order to give her the
means to acquire drugs to feed her own addiction. 131 The court
held:
The applicant has a number of features of her subjective
case that demanded some amelioration of her sentence.
Counsel pointed to her “really parlous start to life”,
undergoing an arranged marriage at the age of 13 to a close
relative who was physically and verbally abusive and
introduced her to drugs. Although her drug addiction
cannot be regarded in any way as an excuse for her crimes
the fact that it had its origins in such circumstances in her
teenage years is of some significance: R v Henry [1999]
NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346 at [273](c) (Wood CJ at CL).
True it is that she eschewed the opportunity for
rehabilitation under the Drug Court program and that it is
an aggravating feature that her offenses were committed
whilst she was on that and other forms of conditional
liberty. But it my view the overall subjective case for the
applicant is one that justifies a measure of leniency that
could not ordinarily be extended in a case involving flagrant
and serious involvement in drug supply. 132

Where addiction to drugs or alcohol is for medicinal
purposes and this contributes to the commission of offense, the
courts will normally mitigate the penalty. 133
B. Substance Involvement and United States Sentencing
1. Overview of United States Sentencing Law and
Practice
As is the case in Australia, each state in the United States
and the federal jurisdiction has its separate sentencing
system. 134 Each system has distinctive features, but there are
important over-arching commonalities of sentencing
throughout the United States. At the broadest level, the main
objectives of sentencing are uniform and are the same as those
130.
131.
132.
133.

El Ahmad v R [2015] NSWCCA 65 at 19 .
Id. at 17.
Id. at 73.
Talbot v R (1992) 59 A Crim R 383; see also JUDICIAL COLLEGE OF
VICTORIA, VICTORIAN SENTENCING MANUAL 10.10.1.4 (2015), available at
http://www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/eManuals/VSM/index.htm#6189.htm.
134. Sentencing (and, more generally, criminal law) in the United States is
mainly the province of states. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613
(2000) (citing U.S. v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)).
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found in Australia, namely: community protection (also known
as incapacitation), general deterrence, specific deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution. 135 While the objectives are
relatively uniform, they are not equal in weight. Community
protection has been the overwhelming aim of sentencing in the
United States over the past forty years. 136
The goal of community protection has been most markedly
pursued through the enactment of prescriptive sentencing
laws, which significantly limited judicial discretion. 137 Fixed,
minimum, or presumptive penalties 138 now apply (to varying
degrees) in jurisdictions in the United States. 139 Prescribed
penalties are typically set out in sentencing grids, which
normally use criminal history scores 140 and offense seriousness
to calculate the appropriate penalty. The penalties prescribed
in the grids have been heavily criticized for being too harsh.
Typical of this sentiment is the following observation by
Michael Tonry:
Anyone who works in or has over time observed the
American criminal justice system can repeat the litany of
tough-on-crime sentencing laws enacted in the 1980s and
135. See United State Supreme Court, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, United
States Sentencing Comission Guidelines Manual, http://www.ussc.gov/guidelinesmanual/2014/2014-ussc-guidelines-manual, (last visited Feb. 11, 2015)
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N] .’
136. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF THE INCARCERATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9 (Jeremy
Travis et al. eds., 2014).
137. Id. at 3. As noted by William W. Berry III, “Prior to 1984, federal judges
possessed discretion that was virtually “unfettered” in determining sentences,
guided only by broad sentence ranges provided by federal criminal statutes. The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the “Act”) moved the sentencing regime almost
completely to the other extreme, implementing a system of mandatory guidelines
that severely limited the discretion of the sentencing judge.” William W. Berry
III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to § 3553 After
Booker and its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 633 (2008).
138. For the purposes of clarity, these both come under the terminology of
fixed or standard penalties in this Article.
139. They are also one of the key distinguishing aspects of the United States’
sentencing system compared to that of Australia (and most other sentencing
systems in the world). See UNIV. OF SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF LAW, CENTRE
FOR LAW AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING
PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 46-47 (2012), available at
https://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/law/cruel-and-unusual.pdf (noting that
137 of 168 surveyed countries had some form of minimum penalties but none
were as wide-ranging or severe as in the United States).
140. This is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior
convictions.
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the first half of the 1990s: mandatory minimum sentence
laws (all 50 states), three-strikes laws (26 states), lifewithout-possibility-of-parole laws (49 states), and truth-insentencing laws (28 states), in some places augmented by
“career criminal,” “dangerous offender,” and “sexual
predator” laws (Tonry 2013). These laws, because they
required sentences of historically unprecedented lengths
for broad categories of offenses and offenders, are the
primary causes of contemporary levels of imprisonment
(Travis and Western 2014, chap. 3). 141

It has been contended that none of these policies leading
to the increase in fixed penalties emanated from a clear
theoretical foundation, but rather stemmed from “back-of-anenvelope calculations and collective intuitive judgements
[sic].” 142 In a similar vein, Berman and Bibas stated, “[o]ver
the last half-century, sentencing has lurched from a lawless
morass of hidden, unreviewable discretion to a sometimes rigid
and cumbersome collection of rules.” 143
The most extensively analyzed prescribed penalty laws are
found in the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines
These
Manual (“Federal Sentencing Guidelines”). 144
Guidelines are important because of the large number of
offenders sentenced under this system and the significant
doctrinal influence they have exerted at the state level. 145
Accordingly, to the extent that this Article analyzes United
States sentencing law, the main focus is on the federal
jurisdiction.
Like most grid sentencing systems, the key considerations
141. Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A Blueprint for
Moving Past Mass Incarceration, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (Forthcoming
MINNESOTA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 14–26).
142. Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to
Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING 91
(Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010). For further criticism of the
Guidelines, see James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values? 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 173 (2010); Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical
Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 92–93 (2005).
143. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 37
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006).
144. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135, at 394.
145. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 143, at 38. There are more than 200,000
federal prisoners.
See E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2013, BJS.GOV,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5109 (last updated Sept. 30,
2014).
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that determine the nature of the penalty are the perceived
severity of the offense and the criminal history of the
offender. 146 Prior convictions can have a considerable impact
on penalty, and in some cases lead to an approximate doubling
of the sentence. For example, an offense at level fifteen147 in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines carries a presumptive
penalty for a first offender of imprisonment for eighteen to
twenty-four months, which increases to forty-one to fifty-one
months for an offender with thirteen or more criminal history
points. 148 For an offense at level thirty-five, a first offender has
a guideline penalty range of 168-210 months, which increases
to 292-365 months for an offender with the highest criminal
history score. 149 Thus, an extensive bad criminal history can
add 155 months (more than twelve years) to a jail term.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision of United
States v. Booker, 150 the Guidelines are no longer mandatory;
rather they are effectively advisory in character. 151 Recent
146. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing
Factors? 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1109 (2008).
147. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135, at 50. The offense levels
range from 1 (least serious) to 43 (most serious). Id.
148. Id. at 399. The criminal history score ranges from 0 to 13 or more (worst
offending record). Id.
149. Id.
150. U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court held
that aspects of the guidelines that were mandatory were contrary to the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. Id.; see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
1229, 1236 (2011) (“[W]hen a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal,
a district court at resentencing may consider evidence [that may] support a
downward variance from the now-advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines
range”); Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2203 (2008) (“there is no longer
a limit comparable to the one at issue in Burns on the variances from Guidelines
ranges that a district court may find justified under the sentencing factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”); see also Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237
(2008) ; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (“[W]hile the extent of
the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines
range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether
inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard”).; see also Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 339 (2007) (holding that federal appellate court may apply presumption
of reasonableness to district court sentence that is within properly calculated
Sentencing Guidelines range).
151. Consequently, District Courts are required to properly calculate and
consider the guidelines when sentencing, even in an advisory guideline system.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4), (5); Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts,
while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must . . . take them into account when
sentencing.”); Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (stating that a district court should begin
all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines
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decisions have also held that the imposition of a sentence about
the statutory maximum based on facts other than a prior
conviction is violative of the Sixth Amendment unless it is
based on facts found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant. 152 Nevertheless, the guideline range remains a very
influential sentencing reference point.
Until recently,
sentences within guidelines were still the norm. 153 In 2014, for
the first time Federal Courts imposed more sentences that
were outside the Guidelines than sentences that were within
them. 154 The margin is small (54% to 46%), but it does reflect
a trend by the judiciary to view the Guidelines with less
stricture than previously. 155
range); Gall, 552 U.S. at 48 (“As a matter of administration and to secure
nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the
initial benchmark.”). The district court, in determining the appropriate sentence
in a particular case, therefore, must consider the properly calculated guideline
range, the grounds for departure provided in the policy statements, and then the
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Rita, 551 U.S. at 350-51. See also, Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (“A district judge must consider the extent of
any departure from the Guidelines and must explain the appropriateness of an
unusually lenient or harsh sentence with sufficient justifications. An appellate
court may take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a
deviation from the Guidelines, but it may not require ‘extraordinary’
circumstances or employ a rigid mathematical formula using a departure’s
percentage as the standard for determining the strength of the justification
required for a specific sentence.”)
152. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that the “statutory maximum” is the
maximum sentence that may be imposed solely on the basis of the facts found by
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant); see also Alleyne v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 (2013) .
153. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of
Prior Drug Convictions, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160 (2010); see also Amy
Baron Evans & Jennifer Niles Coffin, No More Math Without Subtraction:
Deconstructing the Guidelines’ Prohibitions and Restrictions on Mitigating
Factors, FD.ORG https://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics—sentencing/no_more
_math_without_subtraction.pdf (Nov. 1, 2010). For a discussion regarding the
potential of mitigating factors to have a greater role in federal sentencing, see
William W. Berry III, Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States, in
MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 2471 (Julian V. Roberts ed.,
2011).
154. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FISCAL
YEAR 2014 (2014), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencingupdates/USSC-2014_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf.
155. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FISCAL
YEAR 2014 (2014), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencingupdates/USSC-2014_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf.
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While criminal history score and offense severity are
cardinal sentencing considerations, they do not exhaust all of
the matters that influence the penalty. Courts can depart from
a guideline for a number of reasons. The most wide-ranging is
18 U.S.C. § 3553, which, in relevant part, states:
(a) Factors to be Considered in Imposing a Sentence—The
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in
paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner. . . 156

The Guidelines expressly set out over three dozen
considerations that can affect the penalty. 157 They also
prescribe several considerations that should not have an
impact on penalty. 158 In order to determine the appropriate
guideline penalty, the courts may factor in a number of
mitigating and aggravating considerations. They come in two
main forms: adjustments and departures.
“Adjustments” are considerations that increase or
decrease penalty by a designated amount. 159 For example, a
demonstration of remorse can result in a decrease of penalty
156. For a discussion of the operation of this provision, see Berry, supra note
153, at 2471; Evans & Coffins, supra note 153.
157. Id.
158. For an historical overview of the development of aggravating and
mitigating considerations in the Guidelines, see Evans & Coffins, supra note 153,
at 2–6.
159. These are set out in Chapter 3 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135 at 341.
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by up to two levels; it can increase to three levels if it is
accompanied by an early guilty plea. 160 The other main
category of aggravating and mitigating considerations is
known as a “departure.” 161 If a departure is applicable, the
court can more readily impose a sentence outside the
applicable Guideline range. 162 Moreover, as noted above
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the Guidelines permit, in rare
instances, considerations that are not set out in the Guidelines
to justify departing from the range. 163 Thus, the range of
aggravating and mitigating considerations set out in the
Guidelines is not exhaustive. Where a court departs from the
applicable range, it is required to state its reason. 164
C. The Relevance of Substance Involvement to United
States Sentencing
Most importantly, for the purposes of this Article, the
Guidelines make it clear that substance involvement should
not ordinarily lead to a penalty reduction. Section 5H1.4
relevantly states:
Drug or alcohol dependence or abuse ordinarily is not a
reason for a downward departure. Substance abuse is
highly correlated to an increased propensity to commit
crime. Due to this increased risk, it is highly recommended
that a defendant who is incarcerated also be sentenced to
supervised release with a requirement that the defendant
participate in an appropriate substance abuse program (see
§5D1.3(d)(4)). If participation in a substance abuse
program is required, the length of supervised release
should take into account the length of time necessary for
the probation office to judge the success of the program.

160. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135, § 3E1.1. at 460 However, §
5K2.0(d)(4) provides that the court cannot depart from a guideline range as a
result of “The defendant’s decision, in and of itself, to plead guilty to the offense
or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense (i.e., a departure may not
be based merely on the fact that the defendant decided to plead guilty or to enter
into a plea agreement, but a departure may be based on justifiable, nonprohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is recommended, or agreed to, in the
plea agreement and accepted by the court. See §6B1.2 (Standards for Acceptance
of Plea Agreement).”
161. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135 at 457.’
162. Id. at § 1A4(b).
163. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007);
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247 (2011).
164. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135, § 5K2.0(e).’

2_BAGARIC FINAL

276

3/25/2016 9:44 AM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

In certain cases a downward departure may be
appropriate to accomplish a specific treatment purpose. In a
case in which a defendant who is a substance abuser is
sentenced to probation, it is strongly recommended that the
conditions of probation contain a requirement that the
defendant participate in an appropriate substance abuse
program. 165
This is a softening from the initial terminology employed
by this section. As noted by Amy Baron-Evans and Paul Hofer,
in its original form Section 5H1.4 stated that drug dependence
and alcohol abuse were never a reason for imposing a sentence
below the guideline range. 166 However, there was no
proscription on these considerations justifying an above
guideline sentence.
In any event, Section 5H1.4 is subject to 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1). Evans and Hofer observe that:
. . . § 5H1.4 is not only advisory after Booker, but by its
terms does not apply at all in determining whether to
sentence outside the guideline range in any manner not
designated as a “departure.” Put another way, § 3553(a) (1)
requires the sentencing court to consider “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant,” and the statute trumps
any guideline or policy statement to the contrary. See
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 44, 45 (1993);
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997). Indeed,
in Gall, the Court made no mention of the Commission’s
policy statements regarding departures, although it upheld
a probationary sentence based on factors that are
prohibited or deemed not ordinarily relevant by such policy
statements. 167

There is no clear and established jurisprudence regarding
the relevance of substance involvement which interprets and
applies the above provisions. In United States v. Perella,
District Judge Gertner noted:
165. See id. § 5B1.3(d)(4).
166. Amy Baron-Evans and Paul Hofer, Litigating Mitigating Factors:
Departures, variances, and Alternatives to Incarceration (2010, revised 2011).
The current wording “ordinarily is not a reason for a downward departure” was
adopted in 2010. Thus, drug and alcohol dependence has been changed from
“prohibited category to a discouraged category, so far as mitigation is concerned.”
Id. at 94.
167. Id.
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The status of being addicted has an ambiguous relationship
to the defendant’s culpability. It could be a mitigating
factor, explaining the motivation for the crime. It could be
an aggravating factor, supporting a finding of likely
recidivism. Barbara S. Meierhoefer, The Role of Offense
and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentencing, 66 S.
Cal. L.Rev. 367, 385 (1992). On the other hand, the
relationship between drug rehabilitation and crime is clear.
If drug addiction creates a propensity to crime, drug
rehabilitation goes a long way to preventing recidivism. In
fact, statistics suggest that the rate of recidivism is less for
drug offenders who receive treatment while in prison or jail,
and still less for those treated outside of a prison setting. 168

In the recent case of United States v. Hendrickson, 169 the
judge reviewed scientific evidence summarizing that
“addiction biologically robs drug abusers of their judgment,
causing them to act impulsively and ignore the future
consequences of their actions.” 170 For the court, the available
scientific evidence raised a “fundamental issue at sentencing:
culpability.” 171 Given that section 3553(a) promotes the goal of
retribution, “a criminal sentence must be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal offender,” and “the history
and characteristics of the defendant” are relevant in
establishing the culpability of the offender.” 172 Therefore, in
dealing with an addict, the court is required to ask how
addiction affects culpability. 173
The court’s response was that in most cases addiction
mitigates a defendant’s culpability:
By physically hijacking the brain, addiction diminishes the
addict’s capacity to evaluate and control his or her
behaviors. Rather than rationally assessing the costs of
their actions, addicts are prone to act impulsively, without
accurately weighing future consequences. This is certainly
true for Hendrickson, whose criminal history coincides
with, and directly relates to, periods of drug abuse. During
allocution, . . . Hendrickson noted that “drugs clouded my
mind and motivated me to do things I would never do had I

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

United States v. Perella, 273 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164 (D. Mass. 2003).
United States v. Hendrickson, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (N.D. Iowa 2014).
Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1174 (internal citations omitted).
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been sober.” Hendrickson, therefore, acknowledges that
drugs diminished his capacity to make good decisions—
something both defense counsel and the AUSA
acknowledge, too. 174

The judge recognized that the Sentencing Guidelines
preclude the granting of downward departures based on the
offender’s voluntary use of substances. However, he negated
the view that the use of substances was always voluntary: “The
Guidelines . . . appear to incorporate a misinformed view of
how addiction affects volition.” 175 Nonetheless, the court made
a distinction between departures and variances and wrote that
it had the discretion to grant variances.
In an interesting twist, the court analogized between
youth and addiction as mitigating factors: “addiction is
mitigating for much the same reasons that the United States
Supreme Court has recognized youth is mitigating.” 176
However, addiction is not:
limitlessly mitigating. For example, addiction may not be
mitigating, or may be less mitigating, where there is no
nexus between the defendant’s addiction and offense; or
where the defendant has had numerous opportunities for
treatment and has either declined drug treatment or failed
to meaningfully attempt to complete drug treatment. Also,
there may be some point at which a defendant no longer
gets the “benefit” of addiction-based mitigation—like the
defendant who, after sentencing, repeatedly violates his or
her terms of supervised release by using drugs or alcohol.
Addiction could even be aggravating in certain situations.
Each case must be carefully considered on its own and all
of the § 3553(a) factors must be balanced. 177
174. Id. at 1174.
175. United States v. Hendrickson, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1166, 1174 (N.D. Iowa
2014).
176. Id. at 1175. (“Just as there are fundamental differences between the
juvenile and adult brain, so too are there fundamental differences between the
addict and non-addict brain. Because of these differences, addicts, like juveniles,
tend to make “impetuous and ill-considered” decisions. Thus, for the same
reasons juveniles are generally less culpable, so too are addicts.”)
177. Id. at 1173. On the facts, the court ruled that Hendrickson’s addiction
was mitigating:
especially when considered together with Hendrickson’s youth. [He] has
been addicted to drugs since he was 14 years old. He is now only 23
years old. Hendrickson has abused brain-altering drugs through most
of the years during which his adolescent brain was still physically
developing. As a result, Hendrickson has sadly, but predictably, made
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Thereafter, the court noted that “district courts may grant
addiction-based variances for defendants who are less-thanexceptional addicts[,]” and “need only ‘adequately explain the
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and
to promote the perception of fair sentencing.’ ” 178 In the judge’s
opinion, Hendrickson’s young age at the time he started using
drugs and “how directly his criminal history is related to, and
influenced
by,
his
addiction[,]”
makes
the
case
“extraordinary.” 179
This case is a perfect illustration of the doctrinal
incoherence and confusion surrounding the granting of
mitigation in the context of substance involved offenders. As
the court notes, “balancing the § 3553(a) factors requires
judges ‘to weigh that which cannot be measured.’ ” 180
Indicating the level of disharmony in the case law, some courts
have held that alcohol addiction is a disease, that such
addiction is a “weak mitigating factor”, 181 that rather than
poor decisions based on impulse and immaturity. Letters from
Hendrickson’s family members . . . confirm this. Id.
178. Id. at 1178 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1179 (quoting Guido Calabresi, What Makes a Judge Great: To A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., 142 U. PA. L.REV. 513, 513 (1993)) (“I acknowledge—
as § 3553(a)(5) requires me to—that the Guidelines disfavor addiction-based
departures. . . . Although “the Guidelines should be the starting point and the
initial benchmark” for a defendant’s sentence, . . . they are ultimately “merely
persuasive authority.” . . . And while I must consider Guidelines policy
statements under § 3553(a)(5), they are only one of the § 3553(a) factors I must
consider in deciding whether to grant a variance. Where § 3553(a)(5) weighs
against addiction-based variances, § 3553(a)(1) weighs in favor of them. . . . I
consider the mitigating effects of addiction under § 3553(a)(1) to far outweigh any
advisory policy statements under § 3553(a)(5). I therefore conclude that
Hendrickson’s history of addiction justifies a downward variance here”) (internal
citations omitted). Id.
181. Campbell v. Bradshaw, 674 F.3d 578, 597–98 (2012) (“Voluntary
intoxication under Ohio law is—at most—a “weak mitigating factor.” . . . To
distinguish this black letter law, Campbell argues that he did not seek to
introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication as a stand-alone factor, but rather to
show its “synergistic effect” on his behavior and his resultant “rage reaction.”
And he relies upon State v. Haight, 98 Ohio App. 3d 639, 649 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
to show that intoxication can be given “significant” weight. But Haight is an
intermediate appellate court decision, followed by at least eight decisions of the
Ohio Supreme Court holding that voluntary intoxication merits little weight in
mitigation. . . . And Campbell cites to no case apart from Haight to support his
theory that intoxication should be treated with significant mitigating weight
(with or without a “synergistic effect” on other factors relevant to Campbell’s
case). Further, the Ohio Supreme Court has upheld a death sentence where the
defendant consumed drugs and more alcohol than Campbell prior to the
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being a mitigating factor it might instead be an aggravating
factor, 182 and alcohol and drug abuse by the offender is not a
mitigating factor. 183
Survey data suggests that many judges believe substance
abuse should impact sentencing. In fact 49% of judges have
stated that they believe that drug dependence is “ordinarily
relevant” to the reducing of a penalty and a similar portion
(47%) formed the same view about alcohol dependence. 184 The
practice, however, is to the contrary.
Drug dependence and substance abuse is not regularly
cited as a reason for a reduced sentence. In 2014, sentences
were handed down in 75,836 federal cases. Drug dependence
or alcohol abuse was cited as a reason to impose a sentence
below the guideline range under § 3553(a) in only 423 cases. 185
In addition to this, there were twenty-seven straight
departures. 186 Thus, substance abuse impacts penalty in less
than 1% of cases.
Sentencing law in the United States is not uniform and
each state has different aggravating and mitigating factors.
This includes the approach to substance involvement. The
commission of the crime, and where the defendant had also been diagnosed with
alcohol dependence and a personality disorder.”)
182. United States v. Sogan, 388 Fed. Appx. 521, 524–25 (2010).
183. United States v. Estrada, 425 Fed. Appx. 390, 391 (2011) (“The district
court did not fail to consider Cortez’s drug and alcohol abuse; rather, it explained
that it did not regard such abuse to be a mitigating factor. Because of Cortez’s
mendacity and extensive and violent criminal history, the court stated, a nonGuidelines sentence was necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, to deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public
from further crimes, and to provide just punishment for the offense. The district
court’s reasons were adequate.”)
184. Evans & Hofer, supra note 166, at 48.
185. 2014 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/annualreports-sourcebooks/2014/sourcebook-2014 (last visited Aug. 25, 2015) (Tables
25A & 25B). These are described as cases “Downward Departures with Booker
and 18 U.S.C. § 3553” and consist of “cases with a sentence below the guideline
range that include both a departure (see Downward Departure From Guideline
Range) as well as a sentence outside the guideline system mentioning either
Booker; 18 U.S.C. § 3553; or related factors as a reason for sentencing below the
guideline range.”
186. Id. at Table 25A, where these cases are described as “Downward
Departure From Guideline Range Downward Departure From Guideline Range”
and which consist of cases “with departures below the guideline range that do not
cite as a reason either Booker; 18 U.S.C. § 3553; or factors or reasons specifically
prohibited in the provisions, policy statements, or commentary of the federal
guidelines manual.”
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divergence is illustrated by comparing the relevance of
substance abuse to sentencing in the four largest states
(California, Texas, Florida, and New York). In California,
substance involvement is not of itself an aggravating 187 or
mitigating factor. 188 However, under the California Rules of
Court, Rule 4.423 substance involvement can indirectly be
relevant to other sentencing considerations. Rule 4.423(b)(2)
states, as a mitigating factor, “[t]he defendant was suffering
from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced
culpability for the crime.” 189 “Under the former California
Rules of Court, a sentencing court could consider any mental
or physical factor that, while not amounting to a defense of the
crime, might serve to reduce the defendant’s culpability,” 190
which may be construed as the defendant being substance
involved at the time of the offense. 191
In Texas, the second largest state 192, “evidence may be
offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the
court deems relevant to sentencing, including, but not limited
to: the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general
reputation, his character, opinion evidence and the
circumstances of the offense.” 193 Further, the court violates
due process of law if it assesses a predetermined sentence,
“arbitrarily refuses to consider the entire punishment range,
or refuses to consider mitigating evidence when determining
punishment.” 194 Accordingly, there is some scope for
incorporating substance involvement into sentencing
determinations.
The third largest state, 195 Florida, permits departures

187. CAL. R. OF CT. 4.421.
188. CAL. R. OF CT. 4.423.
189. CAL. R. OF CT. 4.423(b)(2).
190. Jahad, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33868, at 72.
191. CAL. R. OF CT. 4.423(b)(2); Jahad v. Hernandez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33868.
192. See, e.g., Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s Third Most
Populous State, US CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.census.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html.
193. TX. CODE OF CRIM. P., Art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1).
194. See McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983),
overruled on other grounds, De Leon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004); Buerger v. State, 60 S.W.3d 358, 364 (Tex. App., Houston 14th Dist. 2001,
pet. ref’d); Cole v. State, 931 S.W.2d 578, 579–80 (Tex. App. Dallas 1995, pet.
ref’d).
195. See, e.g., Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s Third Most
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from the sentencing guidelines in certain situations but these
do not extend to substance involvement. Regarding mitigating
circumstances, “any downward departure from the lowest
permissible sentence, as calculated by the total sentence points
pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.0024, is prohibited unless certain
circumstances
justify
the
downward
departure.” 196
Circumstances or factors that can be considered include, those
listed in Fla. Stat. § 921.0026(2). Florida lists: “the capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminal nature of the conduct
or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired” as one of the non-exclusive mitigating
factors supporting departure from the guidelines. 197 However,
subsection (3) of the statute states, “the defendant’s substance
abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the
offense, is not a mitigating factor under subsection (2) and does
not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure
from the permissible sentencing range.” 198
In New York, the fourth largest state, 199 substance
involvement is a sentencing consideration in a number of
circumstances. For example, where a defendant is charged
with first-degree murder, New York law recognizes, as an
affirmative defense, “that ‘the defendant acted under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there
was a reasonable explanation or excuse’. . . and while
‘intoxication is not, as such, a defense to a criminal charge,’ in
all criminal prosecutions the defendant may offer evidence of
intoxication ‘whenever it is relevant to negative an element of
the crime charged.’ ” 200 “Under most circumstances, killings
that are a product of mental or emotional disturbance, or that
are committed by defendants under the influence of alcohol or

Populous State, US CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.census
.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html.
196. FL.
CRIM.
PUNISHMENT
CODE,
available
at
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/sen_cpcm/cpc_manual.pdf.
197. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(2)(c).
198. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(3).
199. See, e.g., Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s Third Most
Populous State, US CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.
census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html.
200. James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis
of New York’s Death Penalty Legislation, 17 Pace L. Rev. 41 (1996) (internal
quotations omitted).
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another drug, will not be affected by these formal rules.” 201
“New York’s mitigating factor more broadly applies when the
offender was ‘under the influence’ of alcohol or another drug,
and it does not require specific impairment of the defendant’s
cognitive or volitional capacities.” 202 More specifically, for firstdegree murder, mitigating factors include: “the murder was
committed while the defendant was mentally or emotionally
disturbed or under the influence of alcohol or any drug,
although not to such an extent as to constitute a defense to
prosecution” 203
D. Summary of the Relevance of Substance Involvement to
Sentencing
In summary, the existing approach to the relevance of
substance involvement to sentencing can be set out in the
following eight propositions:
1. There is no clearly established theory or approach
regarding the relevance of substance involvement
to sentencing;
2. In both the United States and Australia, substance
involvement can be a neutral factor, or it can
increase sentence length or reduce the penalty;
3. Pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
there is considerable scope for substance
involvement to mitigate penalty but this occurs in
less than one percent of cases;
4. In Australia and some jurisdictions in the United
States, substance involvement can aggravate
penalty when an offender commits a crime while
intoxicated, and it is foreseeable that this state
would result in him or her committing a crime;
5. In Australia, substance involvement can also
aggravate penalty where it enhances the prospect
of recidivism;
6. Substance abuse can mitigate penalty where the
offender sells drugs to obtain money to feed a drug
habit, but there is no mitigation where the offender
commits a robbery to obtain money to purchase
201. Id.
202. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 400.27(9)(e) (McKinney 1996); Acker, supra note 200,
at 118 n.329.
203. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. §400.27 (McKinney 1996).
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drugs to sustain a drug habit;
7. In Australia and some states in the United States,
intoxication also reduces penalty where it caused
the offender to act out of character, or the substance
abuse was supposedly not willed because the habit
was in response to an unfavorable life event; and
8. In Australia and some parts of the United States,
substance involvement can also mitigate penalty
when the prospects of rehabilitation are enhanced
by a reduced sentence.

III. EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING LAW
As we have seen, there are no clear principles regarding
the manner in which substance involvement should be
incorporated into the sentencing calculus.
The greatly
divergent responses to the issue demonstrate a lack of
doctrinal and jurisprudential clarity. This part of the Article
attempts to establish clear-cut guiding principles in this area.
The starting point is to evaluate the validity of the reasons
that have been provided by the courts for according substance
use relevance in the sentencing calculus. We start with the
supposed connection between substance involvement and
culpability.
A. Drug Use as Going to Culpability is Irrelevant – Either
as Mitigating or Aggravating
As noted above, substance use can lead to either increased
or diminished culpability, with the sentence being increased or
reduced accordingly.
The main circumstance in which
intoxication is regarded as increasing culpability is where the
offender is aware (from previous experience) that it will
increase the chance of him or her engaging in criminal conduct.
Decreased culpability can occur where the offender commenced
drug use for reasons that were not totally the free choice of the
offender or where intoxication causes the offender to act out of
character.
This area of the law is confusing and made obscure by the
fact that there are a plethora of vague and unclear concepts,
standards and tests. It is not clear, for example, what degree
of foreseeability an offender must have in order for substance
abuse to aggravate penalty based on previous misconduct
while intoxicated, or what types of life events are so traumatic
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that a person is supposedly compelled to commence using
drugs or alcohol.
The most complex inquiry relating to the relevance of
substance involvement to sentencing concerns the extent to
which offenders are responsible for their use and abuse of
drugs. This has resulted in fierce debate among Australian
judges. 204 Some judges have held that offenders are fully
responsible for their decision to commence using drugs and
ongoing choices relating to their conduct while intoxicated. 205
By contrast, other judges have taken the diametrically
opposite view, stating that drug use is often a matter compelled
on offenders. 206
Ascertaining the correct position in this regard, either
generally or in relation to specific offenders, is complex because
at the scientific level of learning and understanding the extent
to which illicit drugs and alcohol actually grip and drive
human behavior is not well advanced. 207 Further, resolution of
the competing approaches to substance involvement and
sentencing often leads into an intellectual journey into
philosophical theories pertaining to human free-will; the
nature of self-determination and our capacity to make choices
which are genuinely free and questions relating to
determinism. 208
At the extremes, there are situations when choice can be
so influenced that we are sure that it is either free or not free.
A person who “chooses” to commit a crime when a gun is held
at his or her head is not responsible for committing the crime,
but one who assaults his or her neighbor under the threat of
being removed as a Facebook friend is fully responsible for the
crime. 209 But often the situation is not so clear cut. Such is the
204. See Part II(A) of this Article.
205. See Part II(A) of this Article.
206. See Part II(A) of this Article.
207. See discussion of the Hendrickson case, supra note 169.
208. For an overview of the relevant philosophical issues, see Robert Young,
The Implications of Determinism, in A Companion to Ethics 534 (Peter Singer
ed., 1991) (explaining that deterministic theory states that all human action is
causally determined); see also Stephen J. Morse, Severe Environmental
Deprivation (aka RSB): A Tragedy, Not a Defense, 2 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 147,
149 (2011) (“[I]f causation or determinism per se were an excuse, no one would
ever be responsible for any behavior.”).
209. The defence of duress is recognised in most all jurisdictions, see Alan
Reed and Michael Bohlander, General Defences in the Criminal Law: Domestic
and Comparative Perspectives, 106–07 (2014) .
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case relating to offenses committed by people who are
intoxicated at the time of the offense.
As it transpires, both the scientific and philosophical
issues are, to a large degree, a distraction in the context of the
relevance of substance involvement to sentencing. This is
because the variable in the sentencing calculus which these
issues relate to (culpability) is not highly important.
Criminal law, by its nature, is focused on prohibiting the
commission of acts which are harmful to individuals or the
community more widely. Criminal law is society’s strongest
form of condemnation and the forum in which we act most
coercively against individuals. 210 Ultimately, the criminal law
aims to prohibit and punish conduct which harms the interests
of others. 211 It is focused on preventing bad deeds, not bad
intentions or thoughts.
In order for criminal responsibility to occur, it is necessary
for the inappropriate mental state to result in conduct which
harms another person or the community. 212 To the extent that
mental states are relevant, it is primarily because there is
generally a strong link between them and actions. Thus, some
emphasis is attached to mental states by our legal system. In
particular, in criminal law, a distinction is drawn between
mental states in the form of intent, recklessness, and
negligence. 213 However, these thought processes are not
210. ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 16 (2d ed., 1995);
Donoso, Alfonso L (2010), The Criminal Law of the Free Society: A Philosophical
Exploration of Overcriminalization and the Limits of the Criminal Law. PhD
thesis, University of York, 2, http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/1453/1/PhD
Thesis.pdf (“The criminal law is the most coercive institution of social control in
the modern liberal state. It criminalizes conduct, prosecutes individuals, and
treats offenders in ways that under other circumstance we would consider as
serious violations of individuals’ rights.”).
211. See, e.g., JAN GORECKI, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33–38 (1979).
212. Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: a Rational Approach (2001);
1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 27 (15th ed.) (“In the ordinary case, an evil deed,
without more, does not constitute a crime; a crime is committed only if the evil
doer harbored an evil mind.”).
213. See, e.g., Darryl Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits
of Culpability’s Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 109 (2012). To the
extent that culpability is important role in the criminal law, this is already often
factored into offence classification. Thus, some offense types are broken down
according to the mental state of the offender, for example whether the outcome of
the crime was intended or the offender was merely reckless or negligent as to the
eventual outcome. It is for this reason that, for example, murder is a more serious
crime than voluntary manslaughter. However, it is important that culpability
beyond offence classification should not considerably be double counted in the
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intrinsically important.
They are only of instrumental
significance because they are regarded as inciting conduct. 214
Intent is more culpable than either recklessness or negligence,
simply because intentional acts have a higher probability of
achieving their stated objective than reckless or negligent
acts. 215
No matter how incorrigibly wicked a person may be, or
how resolutely he or she may intend that a certain harmful
state of affairs should eventuate, no legal responsibility is
ascribed until, and unless, such mental states are accompanied
by actions. 216
Accordingly, the thought and evaluative process that
culminates in committing crime is a distant second-order
consideration to the level of harm that is caused by the crime.
The fact that some individuals have less capacity for clear
thought, and a judgment deficit, does not make their actions
less harmful.
Neither does it diminish their criminal
responsibility—at its highest, it merely diminishes their level
of blameworthiness.
Therefore, while intoxication and addiction can vary
considerably in nature, intensity, and impact, 217 given that
ultimately the thought process that underpins a crime is not a
cardinal consideration so far as the criminal law is concerned,
there is limited utility in trying to ascertain precisely the
degree and nature of the level of intoxication and the way in
which curtails genuinely free decision-making. Culpability (as
opposed to responsibility) is only a minor consideration in
criminal law, so it is not highly productive to inquire deeply

determination of the ultimate penalty.
214. See id. at 109–10.
215. See, e.g., id. (discussing “proportionate culpability”).
216. The key exception to this is the law relating to attempted criminal
offenses. However, even here the degree of intrusion into the principle that
intentions are per se irrelevant is marginal. For liability to occur, it is necessary
for the offender to possess the requisite mental state, and to perform actions
which constitute a substantial step towards completing the offense. For an
overview, see Mail and Wire Fraud: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal
Law, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 10 (July 21, 2011), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41931.pdf. Another exception is the offense of
conspiracy, but again this also requires the commission of overt acts—though
they need to constitute the completed offense. See id.
217. See Jamie Walvisch, Sentencing Offenders with Impaired Mental
Functioning: Developing Australia’s “Most Sophisticated and Subtle” Analysis, 17
PSYCHOL., PSYCHIATRY & L. 1, 5 (2010).
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into how any individual fares against this standard. In crude
terms, culpability is only an approximately 10 to 25% variable
consideration in the evaluation of the seriousness of a crime. 218
This, of course, is not a totally insignificant consideration and
could in some cases mean the difference between a short term
of imprisonment, lesser sanction (such as probation), or a
reduction of months or years of a prison sentence.
However, in order to enliven the culpability element, it is
necessary to establish (as opposed to simply theorizing) 219 that
substance involvement either increases or decreases personal
blameworthiness. 220 It is here that the argument again falls
short.
The most compelling argument for conferring a discount to
substance involved offenders is when the offender commenced
using substances in response to a life trauma. There is an
instinctive sympathy that is accorded to people that have
experienced and suffered tragic events. However, this should
not necessarily lead to a discounted sentence. There are an
infinite number and type of events that cause distress to
people. The impact of the events is determined by the objective
deprivation involved and the level of resilience of the
individual. The trajectory of the response to the trauma that
follows the event does not have a defined path. Painful life
experiences do not foreclose choice. Certainly, negative life
events can incline people towards self-destructive behavior,
including an increased tendency to consume drugs and
alcohol, 221 but for most people hardship is dealt with by other
means. 222 It can even inspire some people to greater efforts and
higher achievements. Most people who experience trauma in
their lives do not resort to substances to assist them to cope
with it. 223 And certainly, there is no scientific evidence that life

218. See Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is
Proportionality in Sentencing, 25 NEW ZEALAND UNIV. L. REV. 411 (2013).
219. In any legal proceeding, including sentencing proceedings, the obligation
is on the party to ascertain a proposition to establish its validity.
220. Or that it is relevant to some other sentencing objective, such as
rehabilitation—this is discussed shortly.
221. See, e.g., Making the Connection: Trauma and Substance Abuse, THE
NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK (June 2008), available at
http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/assets/pdfs/SAToolkit_1.pdf.
222. As noted above, most people do not have substance abuse problems.
223. See generally Lamya Khoury et al., Substance use, Childhood Traumatic
Experience, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in an Urban Civilian Population,
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trauma invariably leads to substance abuse. 224
Once people start using drugs, developments in
neuroscience suggest that the addiction is stronger than may
have initially been thought. It is well-established that the
brain becomes dependent on drugs, such that stopping drug
use can cause severe negative effects. Emerging evidence
suggests that cravings do not stem merely from a desire to
avoid the physical effects of withdrawal, but instead the brain
becomes dependent on chemicals which are contained in the
drug. 225 “It is precisely because the brain chemistry changes
that it is so challenging for an addict to stop using drugs.” 226
Further, addiction to drugs results in diminished inhibition
and ability to control impulses. 227 While it is now clear that
addiction has both physical and cerebral effects, the science in
this area is not fully developed, and certainly there is no
compelling evidence to suggest that drug users are driven to
crime with a strong degree of inevitability. For individuals
that commence using substances, the choice remains of how
this use will impact their conduct. It can be self-regarding or
harmful to others. To this end, at the extremes is the
individual who drinks him or herself to sleep every night, and
the person who commits armed robberies to feed a heroin
habit. Accordingly, the nexus between substance abuse and
crime, while statistically meaningful, is not automated or predetermined and does not undercut the fact that all persons
have a genuine choice regarding the decision to commence
substance use. Thus, the scientific point of reference does not
compel mitigation for substance involved offenders.
The weakness of the proposition that addicted offenders
who sell drugs to sustain their habit should get a discount is

27 DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY (2010).
224. TRAUMA AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
TREATMENT OF COMORBID DISORDERS (Pamela Brown & Paige Quimette eds.,
2003).
225. David Eagleman et al., Why Neuroscience Matters for Rational Drug
Policy, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 7, 17 (2010).
226. Roger Przybylski, Correctional and Sentencing Reform for Drug
Offenders, COLORADO CRIM. JUSTICE REFORM COALITION 15 (Sept. 2009),
available at http://ccjrc.org/pdf/Correctional_and_Sentencing_Reform_for_Drug_
Offenders.pdf; Drugs, Brains and Behavior, The Science of Addiction, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugs-brainsbehavior-science-addiction/preface (last updated July 2014).
227. Przybylski, supra note 226, at 15.
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supported by the fact that a discount is not accorded to addicts
who commit other forms of crime, such as robbery, in order to
feed their habit. If addiction to drugs should partially excuse
behavior designed to sustain the habit, it should apply to all
forms of conduct, not just to drug related crime.
The upshot of this is that existing mitigation that is
sometimes accorded to substance involved offenders on the
basis of reduced culpability should be abolished. This applies
most clearly in circumstances where the offender commits an
offense while intoxicated and supposedly acts out of character.
It also applies when offenders commit crime in order to feed a
drug habit. The one category of people who are not responsible
for their substance choices is children. They should be given
considerable mitigation for their substance involved actions. 228
This principle and approach is already accommodated within
the sentencing law of most jurisdictions, whereby
rehabilitation is the principal objective of sentencing, 229 and
does not have implications for the sentencing of adults.
It follows that there is no clear-cut basis for asserting that
the circumstances relating to substance involvement are so
powerful or directive so as to either negate any genuine level
of choice, or to make criminal behavior very likely. The current
state of learning regarding the impact of illicit drugs and
alcohol is too embryonic for firm conclusions to be made
regarding the extent to which substances influence decisionmaking; and especially the extent to which orthodox
understandings of free-will should be revisited or revised.
Thus, issues of culpability should be eliminated from the
sentencing inquiry so far as substance involvement is
concerned.
While substance involvement should not mitigate penalty,
neither should it aggravate the sanction. The principle that
intoxication should increase penalty where it was foreseeable
that the offender may act inappropriately while intoxicated is,
as we have seen, poorly developed and unclear in its scope. The
principle is also doctrinally flawed. The motivations and
reasons for committing crime are infinite, and intoxication can
be one trigger. Others include anger, greed, revenge, lust, or

228. The science relating to the lack offformation of the child brain is
discussed in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
229. BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45.
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sheer opportunism or malice. All of these motivations are
negative sentiments.
They are negative because they
sometimes result in individuals performing harmful acts.
There is no tenable way to rank these negative sentiments.
They are all regrettable. For example, a rape stemming from
sheer lust is no more or less bad than one that is alcohol fueled.
Sure, intoxication may cause some offenders to commit more
extreme forms of crime, but so too can other motivators such
as revenge and rage. In each case, the cardinal determinant of
offense severity is the harm caused by the crime. The view that
intoxicated criminal acts are worse than other forms of crime
requires courts to engage in an impossible and non-existent
comparison and ranking of the degrees of inappropriateness
associated with mental states that underpin criminal acts.
This approach should be rejected.
B. Substance Involvement, Rehabilitation, and
Recidivism
Rehabilitation is the process of inducing internal
attitudinal reform in offenders so they become more lawabiding. 230 It is normally regarded as a basis for reducing
penalty severity. 231 Intuitively, intoxicated offenders seem
more salvageable than other offenders. In simplistic terms, the
view is that if the offender is taken away from the drink or drug
then he or she will reform. In order for this objective to
mitigate penalty, it must be established that there are effective
and efficient programs which reduce recidivism rates for
substance involved offenders.
The effectiveness of the criminal justice system to elicit
internal behavioral reform in offenders is much in doubt.
Following extensive research conducted between 1960 and
1974, Robert Martinson, in an influential article, concluded
that empirical studies had not established that any
rehabilitative programs had worked in reducing recidivism. 232
The Panel of the National Research Council in the United
States, several years after this work, also noted that there were

230. Theo Alexander & Mirko Bagaric, Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work,
Rehabilitation Might and What it Means for Sentencing 35 CRIM. L.J. 159 (2012).
231. Id.
232. R. M. Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974).
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no significant differences between the subsequent recidivism
rates of offenders regardless of the form of punishment. They
concluded, “[t]his suggests that neither rehabilitative nor
criminogenic effects operate very strongly.” 233
Recent evidence is generally more positive. While there
are currently no programs developed that successfully reduce
reoffending for all types of offenses, a number of more recent
studies have noted some success in relation to treatments and
programs focusing on substance involved offenders. 234
The Federal Bureau of Prisons Annual Report on
Substance Abuse Treatment Programs for the 2012 fiscal year
states that its drug treatment programs are designed to accord
with the best evidence-based practices. 235 They are broadly
divided into residential based treatments (i.e., for inmates) and
non-residential treatments. 236 The Report notes that an
analysis of the residential program revealed that the
recidivism rate for offenders that completed the program was
15% less compared to inmates who did not complete the
program. 237 Slightly higher levels of success were observed in
relation to female offenders. The report, in relevant part,
states:
male participants were 16% less likely to recidivate and
15% less likely to relapse than similarly-situated inmates
who do not participate in residential drug abuse treatment
for up to 3 years after release. The analysis also found that
female inmates who participate in [the treatment program]
are 18% less likely to recidivate than similarly situated
female inmates who do not participate in treatment. 238

The success of substance abuse interventions in the
criminal justice system is also illustrated by the workings of
drug courts. They were first established in Florida in 1989 and
233. See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 66 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978).
234. For an overview, see Elizabeth Drake et al., Evidence-Based Public Policy
Options to Reduce Crime and Criminal Justice Costs: Implications in Washington
State, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y (2009).
235. THE FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS ANNUAL REPORT ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 2012, REPORT TO THE JUDICIARY COMM.
UNITED STATES CONG. (Dec. 2012).
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody
_and_care/docs/annual_report_fy_2012.pdf (Last visited 23 July 2015).
236. Id. at 3.
237. Id. at 7.
238. Id. at 7; see also FY 2014 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: SALARIES AND
EXPENSES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 29 (2014).
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now there are over 2,000 drugs courts in the United States,
operating in every state. 239 The jurisdiction of drug courts is
generally confined to defendants who are substance involved
at the time of the offense and are charged with drug possession
or other non-violent offenses. 240 For some drug courts it is also
a requirement that defendants do not have a conviction for an
earlier violent offense. 241 The normal sanction imposed by a
drug court is a treatment program which lasts between six to
twelve months and part of the program requires offenders to
remain drug free. 242 Offenders who do not successfully
complete the program face the prospect of imprisonment. 243 A
recent wide-ranging analysis of the outcomes from drug courts
notes the following positive outcomes:
•

an analysis of research findings from 76 drug courts
found a 10% reduction in re-arrest;

•

an analysis of 30 drug court evaluations found an
average 13% decline in the rate of reconvictions for
a new offense;

•

a meta-analysis of 57 studies estimated that
participation in a drug court program would
produce an 8% decline in crime relative to no
treatment; and

•

a Government Accountability Office report found
that 13 of 17 courts reporting on post-program
recidivism measured reductions between 4 and 25
percentage points in rearrests and reconvictions. 244

While these figures are ostensibly impressive, there is a
need to approach them with some caution, given that the
offender cohort derives from a relatively small category of
offending types and does not include the most serious type of
offenders. 245
Australian studies have noted similar, albeit guarded,
239. Behind Bars II supra note 14, at 80.
240. Ryan S. King & Jill Pasquarella, Drug Courts: A Review of the Evidence,
The Sentencing PROJECT 3 (Apr. 2009). http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc
/dp_drugcourts.pdf.
241. Id.
242. Id at 4.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 5 ; see Behind Bars II, supra note 14, at 80-81; Elizabeth Drake et
al., supra note 234 (noting that drug courts reduce the recidivism of offenders by
about 8.7%).
245. See King & Pasquarella, supra note 240, at 7.
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success regarding drug and alcohol treatment programs. The
most recent wide-ranging Australian study regarding the
effectiveness of rehabilitation is a report by Karen Heseltine,
Andrew Day, and Rick Sarre for the Australian Institute of
Criminology, published in 2011. 246 The report focused on
changes and improvements to prison based correction
rehabilitation programs in the custodial environment since
2004, when the previous report was issued. 247
The report by Heseltine et al., while unable to evaluate the
effectiveness of rehabilitation programs currently operating in
Australian prisons, summarized recent cross-jurisdictional
studies into the effectiveness of certain rehabilitation
programs. 248 It noted that while there were mixed results,
there were some programs that reported positive outcomes. 249
This included drug and alcohol programs which have been
shown to be effective at reducing substance abuse and
reoffending. 250
This assessment is consistent with the findings of Ojmarrh
Mitchell, David B. Wilson, and Doris L. MacKenzie, who
undertook a major analysis of studies into the effectiveness of
drug treatment programs in prison. 251 The studies they
focused on related to drug users and compared reoffending
patterns of offenders who completed a drug rehabilitation
program with those who did not complete a program, or
completed only a minimum program between the years 1980
and 2004. 252 They analyzed sixty-six studies in total. The
report concluded, “overall, this meta-analytic synthesis of
evaluations of incarceration based drug treatment programs
found that such programs are modestly effective in reducing
recidivism.” 253 Moreover, it noted that programs that dealt

246. See generally Karen Heseltine et al., Prison-based Correctional Offender
Rehabilitation Programs: The 2009 National Picture in Australia, 112 AIC
REPORTS RESEARCH & PUB. POL’Y SERIES (2011). http://www.aic.gov.au/media_
library/publications/rpp/112/rpp112.pdf
247. Id. at 2.
248. Id.
249. Id. at ix, x.
250. Id. at 27.
251. Ojmarrh Mitchell et al., The Effectiveness of Incarceration-Based Drug
Treatment on Criminal Behaviour: A Systematic Review, 8 CRIME & JUSTICE
(2012).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 17.
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with the multiple problems of drug users (termed therapeutic
communities) were the most successful, whereas there was no
evidence to support good outcomes associated with “boot camp”
programs. 254
Thus, appropriately adapted programs can reduce the
reoffending rate of some substance involved offenders. But this
does not provide a basis for reducing the severity of the
penalties imposed on such offenders. There are two reasons.
First, the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs is similar
whether administered in a custodial setting or outside the
confines of prison walls. 255
Second, while rehabilitation works in relation to some
substance involved offenders, it is ineffective in relation to
most of them—as we have seen it does not work in relation to
most of such offenders. This is especially pertinent given that
substance involved offenders have a considerably higher
recidivism rate than other offenders. In one wide-ranging
study, it was noted that slightly more than half (52%) of
substance involved inmates in the United States have been
incarcerated previously, compared to less than one-third (31%)
of inmates who are not substance involved. 256
Thus, substance involved offenders reoffend at nearly
double the rate of other offenders. This fact significantly
undermines the argument in favor of reducing the penalties for
this cohort of offenders in order to pursue the objective of
rehabilitation.
While some treatment programs are effective at reducing
the recidivism rate of substance involved offenders, this
observation largely loses its significance once it is noted that
overall substance involved offenders have a far higher
recidivism—offenders who are not substance involved are far
less likely to reoffend even if one takes into account the success
of drug and alcohol treatment programs. In crude terms, given
that substance involved offenders are twice as likely to
reoffend, a 20% reduction in their reoffending level still makes

254. Id. at 6.
255. Karen Heseltine et al., supra note 246; Behind Bars II:, supra note 14, at
85 (noting that there are even higher levels of success with prison-based
substance abuse treatments and after care programs in Delaware, California and
Illinois).
256. Behind Bars II, supra note 14, at 5 ; see also Elizabeth Drake et al., supra
note 234.
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them a far higher risk to the community than other offending.
The risk that a substance involved offender presents to the
community following the successful completion of a
rehabilitation program is often still higher than that presented
by a non-substance involved offender.
Accordingly, none of the orthodox or existing reasons that
have been offered for factoring in substance involvement into
the sentencing calculus are persuasive. This does not,
however, entail that the link between substance involvement
and crime should be ignored. We now discuss the appropriate
response.
IV. REFORM PROPOSAL
Before setting out reform proposals, we provide a brief
overview of the above discussion and analysis. There is a
strong connection between substance involvement and
offending. Most people who commit crimes are substance
involved, and nearly half of offenders are intoxicated at the
time of the offense. Additionally, nearly one-fifth of crimes are
committed in order to obtain money or property to feed a drug
habit. Given the statistical link between alcohol, illicit drugs,
and crime, there is a tendency to incorporate this into the
sentencing calculus, either by punishing substance involved
offenders more harshly because of the predictability between
substance use and crime, or punishing them less because
substances supposedly reduce culpability. The prospect of
rehabilitating substance involved offenders is also sometimes
provided as a reason mitigating the penalties of such offenders.
Doctrinal clarity and the relevant empirical evidence suggest,
however, that generally no accommodation should be made for
substance involvement in the sentencing calculus.
It is undeniable that there is a strong link between
substance involvement and criminal offending.
But a
statistical association between two matters does not
necessitate a response. There is a stronger link between
gender and crime than drugs and crime. Males comprise more
than 90% of all detainees in United States prisons and hence
are grossly represented in the criminal justice statistics. 257 Yet
there is nothing to suggest that being a male should mitigate

257. See E. Ann Carson, supra note 145 at 2.
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(or aggravate) penalty. Statistical links are no more than that:
numbers establishing an association between events and
circumstances. Once the link is established, it is important to
analyze with reference to the relevant doctrinal and scientific
principles in the field whether any response is appropriate in
relation to the link. And it is from this perspective that the
link between sentencing and substance involvement
evaporates.
As we have seen, the ultimate objective of criminal law is
to prevent, or at least reduce, harmful acts being committed.
The operative and core focus is on actions. Actions are
important because they have consequences. Thoughts and
motivations are only relevant to the extent that they result in
actions. It is for this reason that in defining and calibrating
the matters that are relevant to sentencing, considerations
relating to the mental state of the offender are relatively minor
considerations. Substance abuse impacts an individual’s
thoughts, but has only an indirect connection to his or her acts.
Accordingly, substance involvement can, at most, engage with
a consideration which is a relatively minor variable in the
sentencing calculus. As it transpires, this variable is not
enlivened at all, given that there is no clear-cut basis for
increasing or decreasing the culpability of an offender on the
basis of substance involvement.
In particular, substance involvement should not aggravate
penalty. While there is an increased likelihood of crime being
committed due to substance involvement, the extent of the
increase is not so significant to warrant a higher penalty.
Further, a drug influenced crime is no more inherently
blameworthy than crime committed for other reasons. In some
cases, drug-affected crime might lead to a more serious
instance of a crime than other forms of the same offense (for
example the offender may act more violently). But if this does
occur, there is ample scope to aggravate penalty on the basis of
existing sentencing principles (for example, the principle of
proportionality which matches the hardship of the sanction to
the seriousness of the offense). 258
The objective of rehabilitation is the strongest argument
for factoring in substance involvement into sentencing
258. JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT: A
CRITICAL INVESTIGATION (2004).
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considerations. There is evidence that some rehabilitation
programs are successful at treating drug use and minimizing
recidivism. However, most of these programs can be delivered
without a meaningfully reduced degree of success in the prison
setting, and hence, rehabilitation is not a powerful reason for
reducing prison terms or opting for sanctions other than
imprisonment for substance involved offenders.
Given that substance involved offenders have a greater
rate of recidivism (even if one takes into account the rate of
success of rehabilitation programs), an argument could be
made in support of harsher penalties for these offenders.
However, this approach is unsound because it violates the
principle that people should be punished for their (present)
crimes and cannot be punished again for earlier crimes. 259 The
only viable exception to this is the objective of community
protection. Offenders who present a grave danger to the
community should be incarcerated for longer periods to afford
greater protection to the community. 260 However, this applies
only in relation to crimes which significantly damage the lives
and interests of victims and any increase in penalty severity
must be commensurate with the increased risk of reoffending.
Balancing these considerations, one of us has previously
suggested that repeat serious sexual and violent offenders
should receive a recidivist loading in the order of 20% to 50%. 261
However, this is irrespective of substance involvement. 262
Apart from this, no further penalty enhancement is
appropriate for recidivists.
Ultimately, there is no rational basis for incorporating
substance involvement into the sentencing calculus.
Decoupling sentencing and substance use would make
sentencing more transparent and predictable. Most of all, it is
the doctrinally correct approach.
Yet it would be unsound to ignore the general link between
259. Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime—Not The Prior
Convictions of The Person that Committed The Crime: An Argument For Less
Impact Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing 51 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 343 (2014).
260. Id.
261. Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime—Not The Prior
Convictions of The Person that Committed The Crime: An Argument For Less
Impact Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing 51 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 343 (2014).
262. See id.
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crime and substances and alcohol. The link needs to be
acknowledged and acted upon in at least two ways. The first
is from an educational perspective.
Public education
campaigns have been held in many parts of the world,
including the United States and Australia, regarding the
health dangers associated with the use of drugs and alcohol.263
This provides people with a strong reason to not use or, at least
in the case of alcohol, over-use these substances. The
education campaign regarding the negative effects of
substances should be buttressed by information regarding the
link between substances and involvement in crime. The fact
that many drug and alcohol users end up in hospital is wellknown. And that many of them wind up in prison should be
equally well-known. This is especially the case given that the
harms of imprisonment extend well beyond period of
confinement.
Imprisonment has an adverse effect on well-being
measures after the conclusion of the sentence, even to the point
of significantly reducing life expectancy. A study which
examined the fifteen and a half year survival rate of 23,510 exprisoners in the U.S. state of Georgia, found much higher
mortality rates for ex-prisoners than for the rest of the
population. 264 There were 2,650 deaths in total, which was a
43% higher mortality rate than normally expected (799 more
ex-prisoners died than expected). 265 The main causes for the
increased mortality rates were: homicide, transportation
accidents, accidental poisoning (which included drug
overdoses), and suicide. 266 Moreover, prior imprisonment has
a profound impact on economic opportunity because it leads to
diminished employment opportunities and reduced lifetime
earnings of up to 40%. 267
The most significant reform that should occur to deal with
the link between drugs, alcohol, and crime is the increased
availability and systematization of treatment for people who
263. See
here:
http://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/
prevention-media-campaigns
264. Anne C. Spaulding et al., Prisoner Survival Inside and Outside of the
Institution: Implications for Health-Care Planning, 173 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY
479 (2010).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139
DAEDALUS 13 (2010).
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have substance problems. There is a present and vast unmet
need for programs to treat substance involved people, both
within the general community and in prisons. 268 The report by
the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse notes:
Of the 1.5 million inmates with substance use disorders in
2006, CASA estimates that only 163,196 (11.2%) received
any type of professional treatment, including treatment in
a residential facility or unit (7.1%), professional counselling
(5.2%) or pharmacological therapy such as methadone,
antibuse or naltrexone (0.2%). Less than 1% (0.9%) received
detoxification services. Inmates were likeliest to receive the
adjunct services of mutual support/peer counselling (22.7%)
or education (14.2%). 269

Thus, the gap between the prevalence of substance abuse
and the availability of treatment is profound. Treatment
programs should be made available to all prisoners, as well as
to substance addicts within the general community. It has
been established that even in purely dollar terms, the return
on investment would be considerable. Estimates suggest that
every dollar spent on drug treatment programs can yield a
saving of up to $7 in crime, incarceration, and healthcare

268. Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:
Summary of National Findings, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 94-95
(2014) states:
In 2013, among the 20.2 million persons aged 12 or older who were
classified as needing substance use treatment but not receiving
treatment at a specialty facility in the past year, 908,000 persons (4.5%)
reported that they perceived a need for treatment for their illicit drug or
alcohol use problem (Figure 7.10). Of these 908,000 persons who felt they
needed treatment but did not receive treatment in 2013, 316,000 (34.8%)
reported that they made an effort to get treatment, and 592,000 (65.2%)
reported making no effort to get treatment.
Another report states: “In 2004, about 642,000 State prisoners were drug
dependent or abusing in the year before their admission to prison. An estimated
258,900 of these inmates (or 40%) had taken part in some type of drug abuse
program (table 10). These inmates were more than twice as likely to report
participation in self help or peer counselling groups and education programs
(35%) than to receive drug treatment from a trained professional (15%). In
Federal prison, a higher percentage of drug dependent or abusing inmates (49%)
reported taking part in some type of drug abuse programs. Nearly 1 in 3 took part
in drug abuse education classes, and 1 in 5 had participated in self-help or peer
counselling groups. Overall, 17% took part in drug treatment programs with a
trained professional, and 41% had participated in other drug abuse programs.”
Jennifer Karberg & Christopher Mumola, Drug Use and Dependence, State and
Federal Prisoners, 2004, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 9 (2004)
269. Behind Bars II,, supra note 14, at 40, Table 5.1.
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costs. 270
CONCLUSION
The connection between drug use and crime is profound.
Many offenders are under the influence or effect of illicit drugs
or alcohol at the time of offending. And most offenders have a
substance abuse problem at the time they commit an offense.
Moreover, the rate of substance abuse use by criminals greatly
exceeds that of the rest of the community. While the
association between illicit drugs and alcohol is clear, the
impact that this has, and should have, in determining the
appropriate penalty for offenders is obscure. Substance
involvement has been held to increase penalty. On other
occasions it is neutral, and at times it has decreased penalty.
The doctrinally correct approach to dealing with substance
involvement in the sentencing calculus has been distorted by a
number of considerations. Principally, it has not been
established against the backdrop of the framework of criminal
law in general, and in particular, the appropriate objectives of
sentencing. The main purpose of criminal law is to prevent
and punish bad deeds; namely conduct which damages the
interests of individuals and the wider community. Drug
induced crime causes no less harm than crime committed by
drug-free offenders.
An offender’s exact level of
blameworthiness for the crime is a relatively minor
consideration in ascertaining crime severity—it is a distant
second to the consequences stemming from the criminal act.
This leaves only a small amount of room for substance use to
mitigate sentence. However, even within this small margin of
possible adjustment to sentence, there is no basis for altering
the sentencing of drug affected offenders.
Substance
involvement should not increase penalty from the reference
point of culpability. Even if the offender is aware that drug or
alcohol use may increase the likelihood of offending, this is no
more blameworthy than other triggers of crime such as greed,
anger, or revenge. Mitigation founded on considerations
270. Principles of Drug Abuse Treatment for Criminal Justice Populations—A
Research-Based Guide, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, http://www.drugabuse.gov/
publications/principles-drug-abuse-treatment-criminal-justice-populations/
principles (last updated Apr. 2014); See Susan L. Ettner et al., Benefit-Cost in the
California Treatment Outcome Project; Does Substance Abuse Treatment “Pay for
Itself?”, 41 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 192 (2006).
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relating to culpability for drug involved offenders should not be
accorded given that there is a meaningful degree of choice
exercised by offenders in either deciding to initially commence
using substances, or continuing to persist with the use of illicit
drugs or alcohol.
The strongest basis for reducing the severity of sentences
for drug involved offenders is because, ostensibly, this could
improve the rehabilitation prospects of offenders. However,
this justification fails for two reasons. First, to the extent that
rehabilitative programs are effective, their success is not
meaningfully diminished by the fact they are delivered in the
prison setting. Thus, the objective of rehabilitation does not
necessarily lighten penalties. Rather it provides a reason for
ensuring that whatever penalty is imposed, should be coupled
with a condition that the offender undergo a mandatory drug
treatment program. The arguments in favor of reducing
penalty for considerations of mitigation are even more
definitively negated by the fact that most drug involved
offenders are not rehabilitated, and in fact have a higher
recidivism rate than other offenders.
The solution to dealing with drug involved offending in the
sentencing calculus is to ignore it. This will inject clarity and
doctrinal coherence into the sentencing system. It will also
make the system fairer. There is a need to respond to the link
between substance involvement and crime. However, the
response is not via the sentencing system. The first response
is to have a wide-ranging and systematic community education
campaign regarding the link between drugs, alcohol, and
crime. This will provide people with an additional reason to
avoid falling into substance use and abuse. In addition to this,
it is important that there are greater resources devoted to drug
and alcohol treatment. All substance involved offenders
should have access to such programs, in both the prison setting
and the general community. The provision of such services
should in fact be made available to all people in the community
who have a substance dependency problem. Though this would
require an additional significant public health investment, the
return on investment would considerably exceed the cost.

